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Context and Institutional Structure
in Attorney Regulation:
Constructing an Enforcement
Regime for International Arbitration
CATHERINE A. ROGERS*

The continued success of the modem international arbitration system
depends on the willingness of nation-states to cede control over the substantive
outcomes of international economic disputes while lending their support to the
enforcement of arbitral agreements and awards. 1 States are willing to
relinquish control in the international arbitration arena because they have an
economic interest in facilitating effective resolution of transnational economic
disputes, 2 and because international arbitration has proven far more effective

* Assistant Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University; Long-Term
Visiting Associate Professor, UniversitA Commerciale Luigi Bocconi, Milan, Italy. I am grateful for the
support and guidance I received from John Baker, Jim Bowers, Henry Brown, Jules Coleman, Mirian
Damagka, Graeme Dinwoodie, Bill Dodge, David Faigman, Bryant Grath, Mary Kay Kane, Lars
Kirchoff, Jason Kilbom, Alain Levasseur, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Michael Reisman, Elizabeth Rogers,
Ted Schneyer, Michael Van Alstine, Marco Ventoruzzo and David Wilkins.
An earlier version of this Article was presented to various faculties during the AALS recruitment
process and at the 2001 Stanford-Yale Junior Faculty Forum (under the title Between CulturalBoundaries
andLegal Traditions:Ethics in InternationalArbitration) and at the 2002 SEAALS Conference, where it

received helpful comments, particularly those from Kristen Carpenter, Thomas Heller, Michael
Trebilcock, Keith Hylton, Judith Resnik and Kent Syverud. My work was supported by a generous
research grant from LSU, and the excellent assistance of Christina Hood and George Jacobson. This
Article, together with its companion article Fit and Function, was awarded the 20th Annual CPR
Professional Article Award for 2002.
I The focus of this Article is international commercial arbitration. Arbitration of what are
considered traditionally "public international law" issues (e.g., border disputes) may require a different
approach because the nature of representation in those disputes and the mechanisms for enforcing awards
differ in important ways from international commercial arbitration. For a description of the particulars of
legal representation of states before the International Court of Justice ("ICJ") and the emphasis on
nationality as a professional criterion in representation of nation-states in international adjudication, see
Kurt Taylor Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How InternationalIs 'International'Law?, 22 MICH. J.

INT'LL. 239, 248-49, 264-66 (2001).
2 States were not always so willing to relinquish control. In the early history of international
arbitration, judges often expressed their contempt for arbitral agreements by refusing to enforce awards or
by modifying them. Thomas E. Carbonneau, ArbitralJustice: The Demise of Due Process in American

Law, 70 TuL. L. REv. 1945, 1948 (1996) (describing nineteenth century judicial perception of arbitration
as an inappropriate attempt to divest courts of their jurisdiction); see also Philip J. McConnaughay, The
Risks and Frtuesof Lawlessness: A "Second Look" at InternationalCommercialArbitration,93 NW. U.

L. REv. 453, 462 (1999). As the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged nearly thirty years ago, international
arbitration has more recently become appreciated as vital to the global economy and to U.S. participation
in world trade. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
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than national courts at resolving those disputes. 3 The question that looms large
over the future of international arbitration is: How much should states yield to
the international arbitration system? This Article attempts to answer the
question as it applies to the specific context of regulating attorney conduct.
In a companion article, I exposed the complete absence of ethical guidance
and regulation in international arbitration and attendant problems.4 Because
international arbitration is intentionally disassociated from sovereigns, there is
no obvious source for regulating participating attorneys. The host state, in
which the arbitration takes place, is assigned a relatively passive role that does
not include the ethical regulation of attorneys. Additionally, it is doubtful that
the ethical regulations of an attorney's home state apply in an international
arbitration. Even if such regulations do apply, each counsel is bound by
different home state regulations that are likely to impose different ethical
obligations. Therefore, attorneys in an international arbitration are either each
abiding by different and often conflicting national ethical rules, or are engaging
in a completely unregulated ethical free-for-all.
Historically, this absence of formal regulation was not problematic, and
even went unnoticed. The international arbitration community was comprised
of a small, intimate group of practitioners who enjoyed a tacit understanding of
what constituted appropriate conduct in that context. 5 However, as the field of
international lawyers has expanded in both number and in the variety of
cultural backgrounds, informal social norms can no longer provide either
6
adequate guidance or control in the face of increasing conflicts.
Even if international arbitration is a resilient institution, the absence of
ethical consensus or regulation is increasingly disrupting arbitral proceedings.
For example, a party may discover halfway through proceedings that, contrary
to its own practices, the other party has been engaging in ex parte
communication with its party-appointed arbitrator (even about such matters as
case strategy) 7 or in pretestimonial communications with witnesses (a practice
3 While there are various ways to evaluate the relative effectiveness of litigation and arbitration,
one of the most important measures is the ultimate enforceability of arbitral awards as compared to
national court judgments. W. MICHAEL REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION:
CASES, MATERIALS AND NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES 1215

(1997) ("[A]rbitral awards as a whole enjoy a higher degree of transnational certainty than judgments of
national courts."); see also Saul Perloff, The ies that Bind: The Limits of Autonomy and Uniformity in
InternationalCommercialArbitration,13 U. PA. J. INT'LBUS. L. 323, 325 n.ll (1992).
4 Catherine A. Rogers, Fit and Function in Legal Ethics: Developing a Code of Conduct for
InternationalArbitration,23 MICH. J. INT'LL. 341, 357-373 (2002).
5 Detlev F. Vagts, The InternationalLegal Profession: A Needfor More Governance?, 90 AM. J.
INT'L L. 250, 250 (1996).
6 Rogers, supra note 4, at 355; see also Martin Hunter, Ethics of the InternationalArbitrator, 53
ARB. 219, 220 (1987) (concluding that the world of international commercial arbitration is no longer a
club of gentlemen, but one that needs explicit guidelines for conduct).
7 Several commentators have noted that differences in national perspectives regarding the
acceptability of ex parte communication with arbitrators cause disruption. See, e.g., Detlev F. Vagts,
InternationalLegal Ethics and ProfessionalResponsibility, 92 AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 378, 379 (1998)
(using the recurring problem of conflicting attitudes regarding ex parte communications with arbitrators
as the basis for panel discussion of ethics in arbitration); Malcolm Wilkey, The Practicalitiesof CrossCulturalArbitration, in CONFLICTING LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES
AND NEW TRENDS 79, 86 (Stefan N. Frommel & Barry A.K. Rider eds., 1999) (describing differing
approaches to ex parte communication as a recurrent problem in international arbitration); Nicholas C.
Ulmer, Ethics and Effectiveness: Doing Well by Doing Good, in THE COMMERCIAL WAY TO JUSTICE:
THE 1996 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE CHARTERED INSTITUTE OF ARBITRATORS 167, 171 &
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forbidden in most civil law jurisdictions).8 Compounding these problems,
arbitrators who are unaware of parties' disparate ethical traditions may unfairly
discredit one party's presentation of its case based on perceived misconduct. 9
Alternatively, those arbitrators who might attempt to resolve the ethical
collisions on an ad hoc basis risk disrupting the parties' settled expectations, if
not their nationally established procedural rights. In response to these and
other problems, I proposed in a companion article a methodology for
developing the substantive content of ethical rules for international
arbitration.10
Even with a methodological vehicle, however, important questions remain:
Who is going to undertake the task of developing the specific content of the
needed rules, and how are they going to be made binding and enforceable on
attorneys in international arbitration? There are no obvious answers. No
supranational bar association exists.l" Local bar associations have expressly
disavowed authority to regulate attorney conduct in international arbitration,' 2
and they have generally proven inadequate when called to the task of
n.8 (Geoffrey M. Beresford Hartwell ed., 1997).

For a discussion of the national origins of the

conflicting rules regarding ex parte communications with adjudicators and particularly with arbitrators,
see Rogers, supra note 4, at 363-64.
8 In some civil law countries, pretestimonial communication with a witness would not only be
unethical, but would also expose an attorney to criminal sanctions. In contrast, several U.S. sources
opine that failure to engage in such communication constitutes an ethical breach for a U.S. attorney.
Compare Mirjan Dama~ka, Presentation of Evidence and Factfinding Precision, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1083, 1088-89 (1975) (explaining that, under the civilian model, the "parties are not supposed to try to
affect, let alone prepare, the witnesses' testimony at trial. 'Coaching' witnesses comes dangerously close
to various criminal offenses of interfering with the administration of justice."), and John H. Langbein,
The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 823, 834 (1985) (explaining that under
German law, a lawyer almost never has any contact with witnesses outside of court), with In re
Stratosphere Corp. Sec. Litig., 182 F.R.D. 614, 621 (D. Nev. 1998) (characterizing witness preparation as
an "ethical" obligation incumbent on attorneys), and D.C. Bar Op. 79 (1979), reprinted in D.C. BAR,
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND OPINIONS OF THE D.C. BAR LEGAL ETHICS COMM. 138,
139 (1991) (stating that an attorney who had the opportunity to prepare a witness, but failed to do so
would not be properly fulfilling professional obligations). For an expanded discussion of these
differences and their consequences in international arbitration, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 359-62, 376
& nn. 172-73, and Vagts, supra note 5, at 260 (identifying differing rules regarding witness contact as a
recurring problem in international arbitration).
9 For example, arbitrators from civil law systems in which pretestimonial witness communication
is not permitted may discount or disregard testimony from witnesses who have discussed the facts of the
case with an attorney from a common law system, Similarly, two arbitrators on a panel may ostracize a
third arbitrator if they discover that the party was engaged in ex parte communications with her
appointing party. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 376.
10 Rogers, supra note 4, at 379-388.
11 The only possible candidate is the International Bar Association ("IBA"), which is a federation
of national bar associations and law societies. Despite its name, the IBA cannot accurately be understood
as a supranational regulatory authority because it is not a licensing body that can impose any penalties for
noncompliance. Mary C. Daly, The Dichotomy Between Standards and Rules: A New Way of
Understandingthe Differences in Perceptionsof Lawyer Codes of Conduct by U.S. andForeignLawyers,
32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1117, 1158-59 (1999).
12 In the United States, only a few states have attempted to make their ethical rules directly
applicable in arbitration.
E.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW (APPENDIX: CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY) § 1200.1(f) (LEXIS through Nov. 2002 Sess.) (defining "tribunal" to include
arbitrators). In addition, states have explicitly exempted international arbitration from otherwise
applicable restrictions on practice. Ronald A. Brand, Professional Responsibility in a Transnational
TransactionsPractice, 17 J.L. & COM. 301, 334-35 (1998) (noting that notwithstanding the applicability
of state ethical rules to state-licensed attorneys, several bar opinions permit parties to international
arbitration to be represented by non-state-licensed attorneys). This hands-off approach to international
arbitration is part of the larger deference of national bar associations to international practice. For a more
detailed explanation of this phenomenon, see infra notes 131-137, 173-177 and accompanying text.
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regulating attorneys in other international settings. 13 National courts are
intentionally cordoned off from arbitral decisionmaking and therefore also fail
to regulate attorney conduct. Finally, it is unlikely that arbitrators currently
have the authority to impose sanctions for attorney misconduct.
In the absence of any obvious candidates, and without the benefit of
preexisting regulatory structures, the project must be one of construction. This
Article provides a blueprint for an enforcement regime that would consign
primary promulgation and enforcement functions to the international
arbitration system itself.14 Under my proposal, arbitral decisionmakers and
institutions will be allocated the most immediate regulatory tasks. The
ultimate aim of my proposal, however, is to balance allocation of the various
enforcement tasks among arbitral decisionmakers and institutions, national
courts, and bar associations in a manner that supports and reinforces the
structure of the international arbitration system while providing efficient and
effective enforcement.
I begin in Part I by outlining a theoretical model based on a framework
proposed by U.S. legal process scholars to analyze domestic attorney
regulation. The model assigns regulatory responsibilities based on the relative
competence of particular institutions in performing designated tasks, subject to
the condition that such assignment is compatible with the normative structure
of the system, which in this case is the international arbitration system. Since
the model requires consideration both of the comparative institutional
competencies of various components and the normative goals of the
international arbitration system, I provide an overview of the constitutional
structure of the international arbitration system. Although I ultimately propose
in Part II that national institutions should not act as primary regulators, nationstates retain an interest in regulation of the behavior of lawyers who are
licensed in their jurisdictions and whose work affects the rights and obligations
of their citizens. Because these residual interests must be taken into account in
the proposed regime, I examine their nature and extent in the final section of
Part I.
13 See, e.g., IvO G CAYTAS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: CONFLICTS iN PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY 3 (1992) ("[l]t is fairly rare that misconduct 'abroad' results in all too serious
consequences 'at home' (examples notwithstanding) .... [S]anctions remain essentially local."); Brand,
supra note 12, at 302-03 (noting that regulation of the profession "remains local in both scope and
administration, often providing little guidance").
14 Extensive debate has centered on whether there is any such thing as an international legal
system. Compare H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 79-99 (2d ed. 1994) (contending that
international law lacks the secondary rules of recognition, adjudication, and change necessary to
constitute a legal system), with Pierre-Marie Dupuy, The Danger of Fragmentationor Unification of the
InternationalLegal System and the InternationalCourt of Justice, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 791,
793-94 (1999) (challenging Hart's analysis and concluding that there is an international legal system).
See generally JOSEPH RAZ, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 1-2 (1970) (describing the problems of
existence, identity, structure, and content that must be addressed in a complete theory of what constitutes
a legal system). For the purpose of developing international ethical norms, it is not necessary to weigh in
on this debate, or to contemplate whether international commercial arbitration might constitute a
subsystem, its own legal system, or multiple legal systems. To avoid confusion, I use the term "system,"
rather than "legal system," to refer to the intricate network of governmental, intergovernmental, and
private institutions, along with the national laws and international agreements, that facilitate the practice
of international commercial arbitration. See W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 9-10 (1992) (noting that
"national systems involve an interaction between international agreements expressing mandatory
international control policies and national legislative instruments which operate in tandem with the
international agreements").
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Based on the context, institutional structures, and limitations outlined in
Part I, in Part II I undertake the constructive project of mapping a regime for
integrating professional discipline mechanisms into the international
commercial arbitration system. I propose integrating ethical norms into the
existing bodies of arbitral rules, making arbitral institutions promulgators and
implementers of ethical rules.15 This approach will make the application of
ethical rules the product of party agreement and subject to party modification.
Enforcement of these ethical rules would require empowering arbitrators to
impose what I will call sanction awards, in which they would explain the
nature of the violation. Attorneys would be personally subject to this new
arbitrator power. To effectuate these new powers and liabilities, I propose that
sanction awards be published and that national court review of such awards be
enhanced.
Under this regime, the general ethical rules laid out in codes will be
developed and amplified through a body of arbitral jurisprudence that is
subject to partial review by national courts. National institutions will provide
the power and safeguards necessary to ensure that the sanctioning of attorneys
is both effective and fair. Moreover, these institutions will be able to protect
their national interests in attorney regulation through enforcement of
fundamental limitations on the power to modify arbitral ethical codes.
Because the proposed enforcement regime appears to privatize ethical
rulemaking and contemplates significant new powers for arbitrators, it
implicates deeper concerns about the limits of private adjudication and the
government monopoly on rulemaking in the realm of professional legal ethics.
While it is beyond the project of any single article to explore the full scope of
these concerns, I respond in Part III to the most significant substantive
objections. The inevitable future debate on these issues will determine how the
remaining symbolic objections will be resolved and whether states will
relinquish control in this area. Such cooperation from states is necessary to
ensure the continued vitality of international commercial arbitration and to
respond to the inescapable need for attorney regulation in this context.
I.

A CONSTRUCTIVE MODEL FOR DEVELOPING A REGULATORY REGIME

TAILORED TO THE STRUCTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION SYSTEM

Even within the confines of the U.S. legal system, there is extensive debate
among legal ethicists about the appropriate mechanisms and sources of
attorney discipline. As specialization in the legal profession has rendered the

15 See infra Part II.A-B. The most prominent arbitral institutions are the International Chamber of

Commerce ("ICC") in Paris, the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") in New York, the London
Court of International Arbitration ("LCIA"), and the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce ("SCC").
REISMAN, supra note 14, at 107. In addition, there are a number of newer institutions worth noting, such
as the Chamber of National and International Arbitration of Milan, the Venice Court of National and

International Arbitration, and the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Center. As an
alternative to institutional arbitration, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
("UNCITRAL") has published rules for use in noninstitutional or ad hoc arbitration.
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traditional, monolithic model of legal ethics obsolete,16 no clear consensus has
emerged about how the various facets of attorney functions should be
regulated. A growing movement towards specificity and contextualization has
been observed and advocated, but also resisted and protested against.17 In his
path-breaking article with the deceptively simple title, Who Should Regulate
Lawyers?,18 David Wilkins develops a framework for understanding and
evaluating this debate. Although he developed this framework for the U.S.
legal profession, Wilkins' analytic model can translate into a prescriptive
model for developing a regime for enforcing attorney ethics in other contexts
such as international arbitration. I undertake this translation in Part I.A, so that
the definitional tools Wilkins provides can be used in later sections to evaluate
the proposed enforcement regime in comparison to other possible alternatives.
In Part I.B, I develop an account of the international arbitration system,
describing the allocation of power among and the relative institutional
competencies of the various institutions involved. Finally, in Part I.C, I
provide a detailed examination of the national interests implicated in regulation
of attorneys in international arbitration, which must be satisfied if nation-states
are to be persuaded to relinquish control in this area.
A. A Model for Prescribingan Enforcement Regime
Before developing a prescriptive proposal for regulating attorneys in the
international arbitration system, it is necessary to inventory the range of
possible options and to develop a methodology for choosing among them.
Wilkins identifies four paradigmatic models of enforcement mechanisms and
the two types of arguments most often invoked to support or critique each
model. This Part will provide a brief overview of Wilkins' theory and
terminology and will explain how his conceptual model translates into the
international context. Later, in Part II, I employ Wilkins' terms and insights to
evaluate the proposed enforcement regime relative to potential alternatives.
Wilkins describes four types of enforcement mechanisms in the U.S.
context: disciplinary controls, liability controls, institutional controls, and
legislative controls.19 Disciplinary controls refer to traditional mechanisms
16 David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count: RegulatingLawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1147, 1151 (1993) (rejecting as outdated the "nineteenth-century image of a homogenous
collection of practitioners whose skills and circumstances are functionally interchangeable").
17 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KELLY, LIVES OF LAWYERS: JOURNEYS IN THE ORGANIZATIONS OF

PRACTICE 8-12 (1994) (arguing that different professional environments develop distinct conceptions of
"legal professionalism"); Robert L. Nelson & David M. Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism: The
ProfessionalIdeologies of Lauyers in Context, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 177, 179180 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds., 1992) (arguing that professional legal values are developed in the
"arenas" in which they are produced); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., My Station As a Lawyer, 6 GA. ST. U. L.
REV. 1, 7-9 (1989) (arguing that a lawyer's ethical obligations derive from the unique requirements of his
or her "station"); DAVID LUBAN,

LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY 126-27 (1988)

(critiquing contexualist claims from the perspective of moral agency); Martha Minow & Elizabeth
Spelman, In Context, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1597, 1597-1601 (1990) (raising the problem of how to
determine which contextual factors are relevant for which purposes).
18 David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 801 (1992) [hereinafter
Wilkins, Who Should Regulate]. The influence of Wilkins' work can be appreciated not only for how
often it is cited, but also for how many other scholars it has inspired. For an entire symposium dedicated
to exploring its implications, see Symposium, Institutional Choices in the Regulation of Lawyers, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 33 (1996).
19 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 805-09.
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imposed by local bar associations; liability controls refer to malpractice claims;
institutional controls refer to mechanisms that exist within the institutions in
which attorneys operate (i.e., judicial or administrative sanctions); and
legislative controls refer to statutory obligations imposed on lawyers, which
supplement but are separate from their bar-imposed ethical obligations. In
translating these categories into the international setting, the number of options
multiplies both horizontally and vertically. Horizontally, attorneys may be
subject to multiple and overlapping national controls because multiple states
have an interest in and jurisdiction over the same conduct of an individual
attorney.2 0 Vertically, in addition to national mechanisms, there can be
international enforcement mechanisms, which become attractive options in
response to the multiplicity of potentially conflicting national sources of
regulation.
To decide among the possible alternatives, Wilkins identifies two types of
arguments invoked by supporters and critics: compliance arguments and
independence arguments. 2 1 Compliance arguments are "efficiency claims
about the costs and benefits of a particular enforcement strategy .... "22 These
arguments focus on evaluating the relative competence of various institutions
in obtaining attorney compliance through substantive rules. Wilkins notes that,
in recent years, compliance arguments have promoted a trend toward the
contextualization of enforcement because proximate institutions have
advantages in their ability to directly observe attorney conduct and to fashion
appropriate remedies.2 3 This is the argument invoked by supporters of Rule II
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 11"), which empowers trial
judges to monitor and control attorney misconduct in litigation. 24 In the
international arbitration setting, contextualization means developing and
introducing enforcement mechanisms that can operate within the arbitral
proceedings, and in particular permitting arbitrators to perform a role similar to
judges under Rule 11.25
Independence arguments are essentially a claim that regulations must fit
with the institutional structures of the system in which they operate. In the
domestic U.S. context, self-regulation by bar associations is defended as
necessary for attorneys to maintain independence from the state, which
presumably enables them to better protect the individual rights of clients

20 As described in more detail below, under traditional theories of prescriptive jurisdiction, several
nation-states may have jurisdiction over particular attorney conduct. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
21 See Wilkins, Who ShouldRegulate, supra note 18, at 805-814. Wilkins also identifies a third set
that he classifies as "content arguments," which he cabins off from his primary discussion of enforcement
issues. Although Wilkins later acknowledged the potential costs and difficulties of cordoning off the
debate about content that often underlies alternative enforcement mechanisms, separation avoids the
more perilous problems that arise when content and compliance arguments are conflated. David B.
Wilkins, How Should We Determine Who Should Regulate Lawyers?-ManagingConflict and Context in

ProfessionalRegulation, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 465, 468-69 (1996) [hereinafter Wilkins, How Should We
Determine].
22 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 804.
23 Id. at 819-820.
24 Id. at 812; see also FED. R. Crv.P. 11.
25 See infra Part II.
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against state power.26 Judicial power to regulate attorneys, and reciprocal
limitations on legislative or executive power, are defended on similar
27
constitutional structure arguments tied to separation of powers principles.
Thus, independence arguments are ultimately claims that enforcement
mechanisms must be consistent with the constitutional structure of the U.S.
system. As will be described in more detail in the following section, in the
arbitration setting there is an analogous, if somewhat distinct, concern that
lawyers be independent, not so much from particular branches of a particular
government, but independent from all national governments.
The final area in which Wilkins' framework provides a means for
critiquing the proposed enforcement regime is in his classification of the types
of attorney misconduct that regulation seeks to prevent. Identifying the nature
of potential misconduct can aid in identifying the most effective mechanisms
for regulating against such misconduct.
Wilkins divides potential misconduct into two general categories: agency
problems, meaning conduct that injures clients, and externality problems,
meaning conduct that imposes unjustified harms on third parties or the legal
framework.2 8 As Wilkins explains, certain types of enforcement mechanisms
are more effective at controlling certain types of misconduct. For example,
systems that depend on voluntary client or lawyer reporting are unlikely to
effectively control for externality problems because there are no tangible
rewards for lawyers, and clients are unlikely to report strategic behavior taken
on their behalf.29 On the other hand, what Wilkins refers to as "situational
monitoring" by both adversaries and judges can be very effective at controlling
strategic behavior in an adjudicatory context. This added effectiveness comes
from the fact that they enjoy certain informational advantages (e.g., they

26 Cf Monroe H. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The
Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv. 1469, 1482-84 (1966) (defending notion of attorney
independence on the ground that it is necessary to individual liberty and other liberal democratic values).
Notably, one of the objections to the contextualization of attorney regulation is based on what Wilkins
refers to as "the traditional model's facade of universality" in the lawyer's role. Wilkins, How Should We
Determine, supra note 21, at 483. While Wilkins has elsewhere effectively dismantled the assertion of
universality within the U.S. legal profession, once outside the context of the U.S. legal culture, claims
about the universality of attorneys' roles become even more attenuated. Id. Although independence is
often regarded as a universal feature of attorneys, it has a distinct meaning in various countries. In many
European civil law countries, attorneys have semiofficial status. This implies that they are collaborators
with, rather than independent from, the government. Rogers, supra note 4, at 365-66. This status is
sometimes even made explicit, as in Germany, where attorneys are part of dffentliche Rechispflege, a
concept of administration of law, and in Greece, where the "Lawyers' Code" characterizes lawyers as
"unsalaried Public Servants." Id at 389.
27 As Professors Wolfram and Wilkins explain, there are essentially two types of separation of
powers arguments: one arguing that, even in the absence of legislative authorization, courts have an
inherent power to sanction attorneys; and the second arguing that courts should have the exclusive power
to discipline lawyers. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 855; Charles W. Wolfram,
Lawyer Turf and Lawyer Regulation-The Role of the Inherent-PowersDoctrine, 12 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REv. 1, 4, 6 (1989-90); see also Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer s Amoral Ethical Role: A
Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 1986 AM. B. FOUND. REs. J. 613, 617 (explaining that, for
lawyers to uphold their moral responsibility to facilitate moral client conduct, they must submit to judicial
restraint). At an even more basic level, some argue that the right of citizens in a democracy to access
public institutions for their private purposes requires that attorneys who facilitate this access remain
independent from those public institutions. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 859-860.
28 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 819-820.
29 Id. at 823-24.

2003

Context and InstitutionalStructure in Attorney Regulation

witness the conduct at issue) and have a stake in the proper functioning of the
process. 30
With respect to international arbitration, the clients are virtually all
corporate clients who are less likely to be victimized 3' and who are wellpositioned to employ their own sanctions in the form of reduced future
employment. 32 Therefore, corporate clients are less likely to resort to formal
disciplinary institutions. Moreover, because the international arbitration
system is an adversarial, advocacy context, the types of misconduct that are
most likely to occur are behaviors that are not effectively regulated by bar
associations. As Wilkins points out, traditional disciplinary controls ai'e not
particularly effective for regulating conduct in an advocacy setting, even in the
domestic context where bar associations are more proximate. 33 Together, these
observations diminish the appeal of invoking national bar associations to
regulate attorney conduct in international arbitration and foreshadow the need
for contextualized regulation within the international arbitration system.
While several scholars have presumed that professional regulation at a
global level is inevitable, 34 none have focused on the unique problems that
arise in the context of international adjudication, let alone on the more
35
particularized problems that arise in the context of international arbitration.
Regulation at the international level raises the same questions that come up in
debates over domestic regulation, but with complexities added by the presence
of multiple national actors and the international layer on top of the competing
national institutions. Wilkins' conceptual analysis provides a model for
resolving these tensions. Under his model, regulatory power should be
assigned to the institutions most likely to secure compliance and to lower the
30 Id. at 835-37.
31 Id. at 824-25.
32 Id. at 827-28.
33 Id. at 823-24.
34 John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code of Professional Ethics?, 15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J.
673, 675 (1991-92); see also Laurel S. Terry, An Introduction to the European Community s Legal Ethics
Code Part H: Applying the CCBE Code of Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 345, 348 (1993)
(suggesting that the Council of the Bars and Law Societies of the European Community ("CCBE") Code,
a treaty-based code of professional conduct that governs the conduct of attorneys in the European
Community, is the first step towards a comprehensive international code). But see generally Christopher
J. Whelan, Ethics Beyond the Horizon: Why Regulate the Global Practice of Law?, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 931 (2001) (tentatively accepting the inevitability of global regulation, but questioning its
desirability).
35 Several scholars have noted the unique problems that arise in international adjudication. E.g.,
Daly, supra note 11, at 1154 n.184 (1999) (describing ethical conflicts in the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY")); Vagts, supra note 5, at 250 (describing problems in the
Iran Claims Tribunal caused by lack of ethical consensus among attorneys). Only one article to date has
directly addressed the issue of ethics in international arbitration, but with more of an aim to raising
questions than resolving them. Mark P. Zimmett, Ethics in InternationalCommercial Litigation and
Arbitration, 670 PLI/Lit. 475 (2000) (raising questions regarding the risks and challenges inherent in
international litigation and arbitration); cf Peter C. Thomas, DisqualifyingLawyers in Arbitrations:Do
the Arbitrators Play Any Proper Role?, 1 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 562, 580-87 (1990) (addressing related
procedural issues of attorney disqualification in arbitration proceedings, but disclaiming any attempt to
encompass ethical regulation). Most work regarding ethics in international arbitration has addressed the
ethical obligations of arbitrators. See, e.g., Chiara Giovannucci Orlandi, Ethics for International
Arbitrators, 67 UMKC L. REV. 93 (1998) (discussing the impartiality of arbitrators within the larger
context of arbitral deontology). While most often framed as a matter of ethics, the professional conduct
of arbitrators raises related, but inherently distinct, questions about the nature of adjudication and the
concept of an impartial adjudicator.
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costs of enforcement for the types of misconduct encountered in that setting.
This prescription is subject to the condition that such assignments are
consistent with the normative limitations imposed on a lawyer's role by the
larger legal structure.
B. The InternationalArbitrationSystem
Because application of Wilkins' model requires that enforcement
mechanisms fit within the institutional structure of the system that they
regulate, it is necessary to provide an overview of the structure of international
arbitration. To date, only limited work has been done to develop a
comprehensive theory of international arbitration as a distinct adjudicatory
system. 36 While developing such a comprehensive theory is beyond the scope
of this Article, a basic theory of the international arbitration system will both
provide background for later discussion of the various institutions and establish
the normative goals that should guide and constrain efforts to choose from
various regulatory options.
The goals of an international arbitration system can be summarized in
three critical and interrelated principles: neutrality, effectiveness, and party
autonomy. 37 In this Part, I address each of these goals in turn and describe how
they form the cornerstones of the international arbitration system. Evaluation
of the enforcement regime proposed in Part II will entail evaluating how well
the proposed regime advances the general goals of the international arbitration
system, and how well the proposed regime fits with the institutional structure
developed to serve those goals.
1. Neutrality
The primary accomplishment of international commercial arbitration is
that it ensures neutrality. International arbitration allows parties to insulate
themselves from the potentially biased national courts of their businesspartners-turned adversaries. 38 For example, the New York Convention requires
36 Although some important works have approached international arbitration from a theoretical
perspective, they have focused on particular problems instead of on providing a more general theory of
the international arbitration system. E.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN, NULLITY AND REVISION: THE REVIEW
AND ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL JUDGMENTS AND AWARDS 129-130 (1991) (examining the

problem of how to control the authority of the arbitral tribunal); McConnaughay, supra note 2, at 477 &
nn.96-98 (noting scholarly debate over source of arbitral power). But see Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and
Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV. 353, 354-56 (1978) (acknowledging international arbitration as
a form of adjudication, but focusing theory on traditional adjudication). See generally Richard Reuben,
ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47

UCLA L. REV. 949 (2000) (focusing on the constitutional procedural protections available and required
in various forms of alternative dispute resolution, including international arbitration).
37 In addition to its neutrality and effectiveness, international arbitration has been extolled for a
host of other reasons, including reduced cost, speed, and confidentiality. James T. Peter, Med-Arb in
InternationalArbitration,8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 83, 86 (1997). Experience has taught, however, that
international arbitration is often unable to satisfy expectations of cost savings and increased efficiency.
Id.; John R. Allison, Arbitration of PrivateAntitrust Claims in InternationalTrade: A World Study in the
SubordinationofNationalInterests to the Demands of a World Market, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 361,

378-380 (1986).
38 It is generally presumed that judges (or juries) will be more sympathetic to the interests of
parties who share their nationality and may in fact be hostile toward or biased against foreign parties.
See, e.g., Gerald Aksen, Arbitration and Other Means of Dispute Settlement, in INTERNATIONAL JOINT

VENTURES: A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO WORKING WITH FOREIGN INVESTORS IN THE U.S. AND
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national courts to refer parties to arbitration 39 and limits the role of national
courts in reviewing final awards to detecting egregious procedural defects or
violations of important national interests. 40 By limiting the role of courts, the
New York Convention precludes national courts from second-guessing the
substantive decisions of arbitrators and thus preserves the neutrality of arbitral
decisionmaking.
International commercial arbitration also assures neutrality by blunting
what parties perceive to be the sharp edges of foreign national procedural
arrangements. 4 1 Parties from different cultures and legal traditions often have
radically different conceptions about what a legal dispute is, what the
resolution process should entail, and what the role of lawyers should be. 42 For
example, Continental parties are jarred by the prospect of being compelled by
U.S. courts to give opposing parties documents containing secret research and
development information or being subjected to the seeming barbarism of crossexamination.4 3 Meanwhile, U.S. parties are dismayed that under most
Continental rules they cannot call on opposing parties to testify, even about
basic matters such as the parties' intent at the time of contracting. 44 U.S.
parties also find it remarkable that under Continental procedures they cannot
ultimately control which witnesses will testify in support of their cases, cannot

ABROAD 287, 287 (David N. Goldsweig & Roger H. Cummings eds., 1990) (citing distrust of opponent's
national courts as primary motivation for resorting to arbitration). A recent survey of participants in
international arbitration bears out this hypothesis. Of those surveyed, seventy-two percent identified
neutrality and sixty-four percent identified enforceability as "highly relevant" to their decision to
arbitrate. CHRISTIAN BOHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 395

(1996). Other popular reasons were expertise available through arbitration (thirty-six percent) and the
unavailability of appeal (thirty-seven percent). Id.
39 The New York Convention requires that national courts refer to arbitration any dispute
implicated by a valid arbitration agreement. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 2519, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 40 [hereinafter New York
Convention].
40 For a more in-depth discussion of the limited role of national courts in the arbitral process, see
infra Part I.B.4.
41 William W. Park, Control Mechanisms in the Development of a Modern Lex Mercatoria, in LEX
MERCATORIA AND ARBITRATION 143, 149 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998); see also Detlev Vagts &
William W. Park, NationalLegal Systems and PrivateDispute Resolution, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 616, 621
(1988) ("International commercial arbitration provides a neutral playing field on which transnational
economic law is enforced.").
42 Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Remaking ofArbitration:Design andDestiny, in LEX MERCATORIA
AND ARBITRATION 23, 27 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998) ("Contrastive procedural traditions provide
for different concepts of justice and, as a result, are difficult to reconcile. Arbitration's legitimacy as a
mechanism for transnational adjudication depends upon how fair the governing procedures are or are
perceived to be by the constituent parties.").
43 Patrick Thieffry, European Integration in TransnationalLitigation, 13 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 339, 356 (1990) ("U.S.-style procedural rules, the absence of which U.S. litigants tend to criticize in
European courts, are precisely those considered to be the most outrageous by European litigants in U.S.
courts.").
44 Under the German Code of Civil Procedure, for example, parties do not have an unqualified
obligation to answer interrogatories and may not be compelled to testify. K. Riechenberg, The
Recognition of ForeignPrivileges in United States Discovery Proceedings,9 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 80,
88 (1988). "In most continental jurisdictions, a litigant's statement is not a recognized means of proof of
his allegations. In others, judges are expected to order formal interrogations of a party only as a means
of last resort ....
Mijan Damalka, The UncertainFate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American
and Continental Experiments, 45 Am. J. COMP. L. 839, 842 (1997). Similarly, under Islamic law, an
interested party's testimony carries no weight. Charles N. Brower, Evidence Before International
Tribunals: The Needfor Some StandardRules, 28 INT'L LAW. 47, 50 (1994).
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conduct private investigations into facts of a case, 4 5 and are powerless to
prevent what U.S. attorneys consider "inadmissible hearsay" from being relied
46
on by Continental judges.
Modem international arbitration has developed a set of hybridized
procedures that accommodates the basic expectations of these various legal
traditions, while constraining those procedures that are particularly
objectionable.4 7 These hybridized procedures have recently been codified by
the International Bar Association ("IBA") so that they can be easily
incorporated into the parties' agreement or adopted when arbitration
commences. 48
The inescapable link between ethical norms and the
interrelational roles established by procedural rules 49 suggests that mechanisms
for promulgating and enforcing ethical rules should track those that have been

employed in the procedural context.

Therefore, in addition to illustrating

international arbitration's strides toward neutrality, the IBA procedural rules
foreshadow how a regime that enforces attorney ethics might be implemented
in the international arbitration system.
2. Effectiveness
Another central goal of international commercial arbitration is
effectiveness. 50 Like the concept of neutrality, effectiveness has distinctive
connotations in the context of international arbitration. At a procedural level,
45 Langbein, supra note 8, at 827.
46 While formal legal categories such as hearsay do not preclude the admission of evidence in civil
law jurisdictions, civilian judges accord less weight to secondhand and indirect evidence that might be
excluded in the U.S. system. See Konstantinos D. Kerameus, A CivilianLawyer Looks at Common Law
Procedure,47 LA. L. REV. 493, 500 (1987) (tracing the development of hearsay and other exclusionary
rules to the development of the jury system). Another notable difference is that objections in the civil law
system are regarded as a direct challenge to the judge's authority and competence. MIRJAN DAMA KA,
EVIDENCE LAW ADRIFT 86 (1997).
47 For a more detailed description of hybridized procedures and their effects on arbitral
proceedings, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 414-17. See also Christian Borris, The Reconciliation of
Conflicts Between Common Law and Civil Law Principles in the Arbitration Process, in CONFLICTING
LEGAL CULTURES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: OLD ISSUES AND NEW TRENDS 1, 13-14 (Stefan N.
Frommel & Barry A. K. Rider eds., 1999); Berthold Goldman, The Application of Law: General
Principles of Law-The Lex Mercatoria, in CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION 113, 124 (Julian D.M. Lew ed., 1986); Alan Scott Rau & Edward F. Sherman, Tradition
and Innovation in International Arbitration Procedure, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 89, 118 (1995)
("[I]ntemational arbitration hearings are often something of an amalgam of the two traditions.").
48 lur Oliver Dillenz, Drafting International Commercial Arbitration Clauses, 21 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 221, 235 n.71 (proposing contract language for parties to incorporate the BA's
Ethics for International Arbitrators into their agreements, thereby making them applicable to arbitrators in
disputes). For further discussion of the hybridized procedures and their effect on the development of a
code of ethics, see Rogers supra note 4, at 417.
49 Rogers, supra note 4, at 387-394 (establishing that differences among national ethical
obligations are tied to different functional roles assigned to attorneys by the procedural regimes of various
national systems). For example, a system's decision to permit or prohibit attorneys from engaging in
pretestimonial communication with witnesses is tied to the system's procedural rules regarding whether a
party's attomey or the judge conducts the examination of the witness. See id at 388.
50 The U.S. Supreme Court has used the term "certainty" to describe effectiveness and its
importance to international trade. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1972)
(approving liberal enforcement of forum selection clauses and choice-of-law clauses to ensure necessary
certainty in international commercial transactions); THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: MELTING THE LANCES AND DISMOUNTING THE STEEDS 1-22 (1989) (discussing the
pressures created by globalization and the impracticability of traditional justice in responding to those
needs).
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effectiveness refers to the ability of parties to determine where their dispute
will be resolved and to ensure that the final award will be enforceable.5 1
Almost by definition, international disputes can be subject to the jurisdiction of
courts in multiple countries.
Forum-selection clauses 52 and abstention
53
doctrines may reduce the likelihood that multiple suits will be brought all the
way to judgment, but the range of possible venues creates tremendous
uncertainty about where the dispute will ultimately be resolved. By contrast,
international arbitration is predictable because the parties choose the place and
manner of adjudication, and national courts are required to defer to that choice.
In addition to reducing uncertainty, arbitration addresses many
complications that arise when an international dispute is adjudicated in
national courts. Adding a foreign party to an otherwise ordinary contract
dispute transforms seemingly inconsequential aspects of domestic procedure
into complex operations involving multiple international conventions and
treaties. One particularly illustrative example is the procedure for serving
process. 5 4 In cases involving foreign defendants, this otherwise routine
requirement usually has to be effectuated through the coordinated participation
of both governments, often pursuant to international agreement. 55 In many
countries, failure to abide by these requirements is treated as an intrusion on
national sovereignty, and in some countries as criminal misconduct. 56
Complicated as they can be, the machinations required to effectuate service of
process are relatively simple when compared to the even greater challenges
51 See REISMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 1215 ("[A]rbitral awards as a whole enjoy a higher degree
of transnational currency than judgments of national courts."); see also Perloff, supra note 3, at 325 n. 11
(describing the lack of a "broad-based international norm assur[ing] that judgments rendered in one
country will receive 'full faith and credit' in another").
52 Forum selection clauses can mitigate uncertainties about where a dispute will be resolved.
Michael E. Solimine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privatizationof Procedure, 25 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 51, 51-52 (1992) (addressing the prospects for and problems related to forum selection clauses).
However, the clause has little or no effect if it is not honored by both the designated forum, which must
agree to accept jurisdiction, and the other forum, which must decline the otherwise legitimate exercise of
jurisdiction.
53 REISMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 91-107 (citing British and U.S. cases that take contrasting
approaches on whether to dismiss or stay cases based on pending foreign litigation). U.S. courts have
inherent power to dismiss or stay an action in favor of foreign litigation presenting the same claims and
issues. In re Houbigant, Inc., 914 F. Supp. 997, 1003 (S.D.N.Y 1996). In determining whether or not to
do so, courts consider the adequacy of relief in the alternative forum, concerns of judicial efficiency, the
convenience of the parties and witnesses, the possibility of prejudice, and the temporal sequence of the
actions. Cont'l Time Corp. v. Swiss Credit Bank, 543 F. Supp. 408, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). However,
federal courts are reluctant to decline jurisdiction solely on the basis of concurrent proceedings in another
jurisdiction. Instead, the default rule is that "[p]arallel proceedings on the same in personam claim should
ordinarily be allowed to proceed simultaneously." China Trade & Dev. Corp. v. MV. Choong Yong, 837
F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
926-27 (D.C. Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Colo. River Water Conservation
Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814 (1976) (federal court will abstain only in "exceptional"
circumstances).
54 Rule 4(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows personal delivery of the summons
and the complaint to the defendant or to the defendant's residence, or delivery of a copy of the summons
and the complaint to the defendant's agent. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1).
55 FED. R. CIv. P. 4(0(1) (citing Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial
Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 362, 658 U.N.T.S. 163); see also
Stephen B. Burbank, The World in Our Courts, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1456, 1474-1485 (1991) (book
review).
56 See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 775-76 & n. 123 (3d ed. 1996) (citing Article 271 of the Swiss Penal
Code and a January 10, 1980, note from the French Embassy to the U.S. Department of State).
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that await litigants engaged in more elaborate and intrusive procedures, such as
discovery.5 7 By putting the substantive decisionmaking in the hands of private
adjudicators, international arbitration avoids intrusions on national sovereignty
and the indeterminacy of international comity that have led to the complicated
mechanisms for domestic adjudication of international disputes. 58 The result is
that international arbitration provides greater effectiveness in resolving
disputes.
3. PartyAutonomy
The third pillar that undergirds the international arbitration system is party
autonomy. Whereas litigants go to national courts as penitents to the clergy,
parties to arbitration are at once the anointing pontiff, the benefactors who
build the church, and the penitents seeking absolution. The parties create
arbitral jurisdiction, choose the governing arbitral rules, 59 select the arbitral
tribunal, 60 determine the powers and limitations of the tribunal, 61 and have the
power to set the specific procedures (both by selecting particular arbitral
institutions and by expanding or modifying the arbitral rules provided by those
57 See, e.g., Patricia Anne Kuhn, Socit6 Nationale IndustrielleAerospatiale: The Supreme Court s
Misguided Approach to The Hague Evidence Convention, 69 B.U. L. REV. 1011, 1054-55 (1989)
(criticizing the Supreme Court's ruling that U.S. litigants are not compelled to follow the Hague
Convention's procedures for gathering evidence as essentially inviting U.S. litigants and courts to intrude
on foreign nations' sovereignty). For an extended description of the complicated procedures and
uncertainties that are involved in national court litigation of international cases, see generally GARY B.
BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS: COMMENTARY
AND MATERIALS 439-497, 546-550 (1989); BOHRNG-UHLE, supra note 38, at 31-40.
58 See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 57, at 14-18 (defining and discussing the relevance of
international comity), 432-488 (analyzing exceptions to the Act of State Doctrine, including intrusions on
national sovereignty), 547-452 (illustrating the complicated mechanisms for resolving international
disputes).
59 Although they are usually silent with regard to the specific course of arbitral proceedings (the
form and procedures for submitting evidence, whether there will be hearings, etc.), every set of arbitral
rules includes some basic procedural rules, such as the submission of initial pleadings and appointment of
arbitrators. However, these fundamental procedural rules are generally default rules. As such, they are
presumed to be the rules that would have been negotiated if the costs of negotiating at arm's length for
every contingency had been sufficiently low and could have been changed through party agreement. See,
e.g., Alan Scott Rau, Contracting Out of the Arbitration Act, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 225, 231 (1997)
(arguing that the Federal Arbitration Act is merely a "set of 'default rules' intended to reflect the

traditional historical understanding concerning the binding effect of arbitral awards"); Rau & Sherman,
supra note 47, at 113 (arguing that silence in arbitral rules and national arbitration legislation set certain
default rules). For further discussion on the nature of default rules in contract, see generally Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, FillingGaps in Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE
L.J. 87, 97-100 (1989) (discussing allocation of contractual default rules).
60 Most arbitral rules permit each party to select a "party arbitrator," subject to objections by the
opposing party based on conflicts of interest. Once selected, the two party arbitrators then select a third

arbitrator who will act as the chairperson of the tribunal. The power to select the arbiter of the dispute is
one of the most distinguishing features of arbitration and arguably the one that provides comfort enough
for parties to relinquish their right to bring claims in their own courts. V.S. MANI, INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION: PROCEDURAL ASPECTS 26 (1980) (describing control over the composition of the
tribunal as the "royal road" that has lured sovereign nations into international adjudication); ALAN
REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION
193-94 (1991) (indicating that parties' ability to choose the tribunal increases their confidence in the
tribunal's decisions); Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEx. L. REV. 485, 527 (1997)
(noting the "widely-shared conviction that the ability to participate in the selection of arbitrators is critical
to fairness in dispute resolution").
61 Because the power of arbitrators derives from the arbitration agreement, arbitrators can only
perform those powers delegated to them in the arbitration agreement. REISMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at
1174.
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institutions). 62 This ex ante control over the process is widely regarded as a
necessary inducement for parties to forsake their right to appeal arbitral
awards. 63 Party autonomy is as essential a premise to the system as neutrality
and effectiveness.
4.

The Structure of the InternationalArbitration System

To accommodate the need for neutrality, effectiveness, and party control,
the international arbitration system delicately calibrates the allocation of power
among national legal systems and courts, parties, arbitral institutions, and
arbitral tribunals. 64 What makes arbitration so effective is that nation-states
provide support for the system in terms of enforcing party-drafted arbitral
agreements and awards rendered pursuant to those agreements. Meanwhile,
arbitration provides neutrality because it restrains national courts from
interfering with the arbitrators' substantive decisionmaking process or
products. This balance is reflected in various aspects of arbitral procedures.
In the initial stages of a dispute that is subject to arbitration, national courts
are required to enforce arbitration agreements by referring the parties to
arbitration with minimal or no consideration of the parties' arguments if they
should attempt to bring the dispute to a litigation forum. 65 During arbitral
proceedings, arbitrators and courts are generally recognized as having
concurrent jurisdiction to order provisional remedies or protective relief. Since
arbitral awards are not self-executing, national courts in the situs jurisdiction
62 For example, under the ICC Arbitration Rules, "primacy is to be given to the will of the parties"
when agreement can be reached with regard to procedural choices. W. LAURENCE CRAIG ET AL.,
INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE ARBITRATION § 8.08 (2d ed. 1990). Some institutions' rules
grant arbitrators authority to formulate appropriate procedural rules. E.g., ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION
art. 15(1), http://www.iccwbo.org/court/english/arbitration/rules.asp; see also Hans Smit, The Future of
InternationalCommercialArbitration:A Single TransnationalInstitution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
9, 23-24 (1986); William W. Park, National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in InternationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 653 (1989) ("Arbitrators may be empowered
to fill gaps [in arbitration agreements] either by the parties themselves, or by the properly applicable
law.").
63 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION IN THE UNITED STATES:
COMMENTARY AND MATERIALS 44 (1994) (describing party autonomy as "[o]ne of the most fundamental
characteristics of international commercial arbitration"); see also Laurence R. Heifer & Graeme B.
Dinwoodie, Designing Non-National Systems: The Case of the Uniform Domain Name Dispute
Resolution Policy, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 141, 193 (2001) ("Under the paramount arbitral principle of
party autonomy, the parties have virtually unfettered discretion to choose the structure and rules under
which their disputes will be decided."). For U.S. parties, submitting to arbitration also involves waiving
their constitutional right to a trial by jury, as well as other guaranteed procedural rights. See generally
Jean R. Stemlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Courts Preference for Binding
Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72
TUL. L. REV. 1 (1997) (reviewing the various procedural rights that are waived by an agreement to

arbitrate).
64 See Stephen J. Ware, Default Rules from Mandatory Rules: PrivatizingLaw through Arbitration,

83 MINN. L. REV. 703, 705 (1999) (noting the various meanings of the terms "private" or "privatizing,"
which include both wholly private systems and systems that have private elements but are supported and
enforced by government institutions).
65 REISMAN, supra note 14, at 109-110. This obligation usually extends even when there are
questions about the scope of the arbitration clause or claims that the contract containing the arbitration

clause was induced by fraud and is therefore void. This allocation of power, usually referred to as the
doctrine of competence de la competence (or, in German, Kompetenz-Kompetenz) and the related
doctrine of "severability" or "separability," ensures strong support from national courts and wide latitude
for arbitrators to interpret what the parties intended to submit to arbitration. For a detailed overview of
these doctrines, see generally Janet A. Rosen, Arbitration under Private International Law: The
Doctrinesof Separabilityand Competence de la Competence, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 599 (1994).
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provide an essential resource for enforcing provisional remedies, and parties

often seek injunctions, attachments, and other provisional remedies directly
from local courts in the situs jurisdiction.
When an award has been rendered after completion of the arbitral
proceedings, courts in the situs jurisdiction, which parties likely selected
66
specifically because of its disconnectedness from the parties and the dispute,
are permitted to review awards on the grounds provided in their national
arbitration laws. 67 Courts in the enforcement jurisdiction will then enforce
arbitral awards without inquiring into the merits of the decision. The only
exceptions to the broad presumption of enforceability occur if the award

violates one of five narrowly defined grounds, which exclude even clear errors
of law, 68 or if it violates one of two provisions that protect important national
interests. 69 This structure is designed to insulate the decisionmaking process

from national courts, while invoking the coercive power of national courts to
give binding effect to the arbitral process, which was consensually created by
the parties.
While national courts have generally been willing to assume the
supportive, but limited, role envisioned by this structure, the limitations on
their role are sometimes in tension with certain national interests and
prerogatives. Most recently, those areas that implicate national law imbued
with public policy, such as antitrust or securities regulation, have been the

focus of attention regarding allocation of power. The fear is that arbitrators
who are unfamiliar with these important and complex national laws may not

apply them correctly, or may even intentionally avoid applying them to
appease parties who are anxious to avoid regulatory obligations.7 0 Critics
claim that the balance of power between national courts and the international
arbitration system does not provide meaningful protection against such abusive
avoidance of national mandatory law. 7 1 Since legal ethics can be considered a
66 "In most international arbitrations, the situs for arbitration is chosen either by happenstance, for
reasons of logistics and convenience, or because of its neutrality in relation to the dispute and to the
parties." Carbonneau, supra note 42, at 28; see also Vagts & Park, supra note 41, at 628 (describing how
the "'arbitral seat'... rarely coincides with the parties' citizenship or residence").
67 The New York Convention grants the courts of the nation in which an arbitration takes place
great discretion in their review of international arbitration awards. See Park, supra note 62, at 680
(noting that the Convention "entrusts the place of arbitration with power to enhance or to impair the
international effectiveness of an award rendered within its territory by the way it exercises, or fails to
exercise, its power to set the award aside"). This flexibility stands in contrast to the precisely delimited
role of courts in enforcement jurisdictions, which is carefully proscribed by the provisions of Article V.
Id. at 682.
68 These grounds for review are limited to what might be considered the "most basic notions of
morality and justice." Id. at 701. For a detailed discussion of the meaning and effect of these provisions,
see REISMAN, supra note 14, at 110-13.
69 Article V(2) of the New York Convention permits courts to refuse enforcement of an award if
the underlying dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitration in the enforcement jurisdiction or if it
offends the public policy of the enforcement jurisdiction. New York Convention, supra note 39, art.
V(2).
70 Ware, supra note 64, at 745; Andrew T. Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration
and MandatoryRules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1292 (2000).
71 Guzman, supra note 70, at 1301-07 (arguing that, under a law and economics analysis, parties
agree to arbitrate for the specific purpose of avoiding mandatory national laws and that arbitrators have
incentives to disregard national law in favor of the parties' agreement). But see Eric A. Posner,
Arbitration and the Harmonizationof InternationalCommercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J.
INT'L L. 647, 668 (1999) ("The evidence suggests that international arbitrators are deeply concerned
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form of mandatory law, or at least an important analogue, these concerns about
the balance of power will likely be implicated by my proposal, which would
entrust primary enforcement of ethical rules to actors within the international
arbitration system. 72 For this reason, a brief detour to consider the treatment of
mandatory or "public" law in international arbitration is warranted.
5.

MandatoryLaw and Punitive Damages in InternationalArbitration

Mandatory law and punitive powers in arbitration challenge the traditional
allocation of power, which is based on assumptions of extreme deference to an
autonomous arbitral tribunal. In the United States, the Supreme Court has
essentially swept aside concerns that arbitrators will not effectively apply
mandatory law, such as securities or antitrust law, in arbitration. 73 Although
not articulated as such in the Supreme Court opinions, this flexibility may
reflect an implicit acknowledgement that the nature of so-called mandatory law
is inherently different in the international context than it is in the domestic
setting. In a national context, mandatory law, as its name implies, is
inescapable. In the international setting, however, there are multiple and
competing claims to prescriptive and adjudicatory jurisdiction over particular
conduct. As a consequence, one nation's assertion that particular law is
mandatory does not necessarily make it inescapable if another nation
adjudicates the case. 74 There are also inherent limitations in applying and
enforcing mandatory law regarding extraterritorial and international conduct.
By contrast, arbitral awards enjoy a much higher degree of international
enforceability than U.S. judgments, particularly judgments involving
mandatory law claims. 75 Permitting arbitrators to apply mandatory law is
about their reputation for respecting mandatory rules."). For the purposes of this Article, I borrow from
Phillip McConnaughay the term "mandatory law" to refer to:
those laws from which parties to international transactions traditionally are not free to derogate
by contract. In this sense, those phrases are roughly equivalent to the traditional category of
"public law," which generally is regarded as including mandatory regulatory laws such as
antitrust law, securities law, and most other economic regulation. I do not intend the phrases
mandatory national law and mandatory law to include those laws traditionally within the
category of "private law," such as contract law, tort law, property law and family law, even
though certain elements of private law can be "mandatory," for example statutes of frauds,
restrictions on covenants not to compete, and usury restrictions. Traditionally, mandatory
elements of private law are mandatory in domestic transactions only; they typically are subject
to derogation by contract, or by conflict of laws principles, in international transactions.
McConnaughay, supra note 2, at n.2. Although national ethical rules are generally regarded as
mandatory, as discussed later, some are subject to contractual modification. See discussion infra Part
III.A. 1. Other national ethical rules may be displaced by conflict of laws analysis. See, e.g., infra note
113 (discussing U.S. Model Rule 8.5).
72 See infra Part II.A-C.
73 See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 622 (1985)
(permitting arbitration of antitrust claims); Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52,
52 (1995) (permitting arbitration of securities claims); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1,
9 (1972); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974) (stating that the United States cannot
insist on international trade on its own provincial terms).
74 Hannah L. Buxbaum, The PrivateAttorney General in a Global Age: Public Interests in Private
InternationalAntitrustLitigation, 26 YALE J. INT'L L. 219, 223 (2001).
75 In fact, existing and proposed judgment conventions generally exclude judgments involving
foreign mandatory law, such as antitrust judgments. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo,
43 HARV. INT'L L.J. 161, 201 (2002). This reluctance to adjudicate U.S. mandatory law claims is only
part of the problem, since the enforcing jurisdiction must also consider whether and to what extent a
judgment that does not implicate U.S. mandatory law nevertheless implicates and offends the enforcing
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important not just to ensure the functioning of the international arbitration
system, but also to ensure the effective enforcement of national mandatory
laws in the international context. 76
Most European civil law countries have been less willing to permit
arbitration of mandatory or public law issues and, in fact, have delineated
broad categories of claims that cannot be arbitrated. For example, Italian law
limits arbitration by reference to negotiable rights (diritti disponibili). Under
these provisions, disputes cannot be arbitrated if they implicate public order,
mandatory norms, and notions of bona mores, if they interact with
administrative jurisdiction, or if they require participation of the Pubblico
Ministero (a corps of prosecuting magistrates with power to intervene in civil
proceedings that raise public concerns). 77 Similarly, French arbitration law
precludes arbitration of claims affecting public policy, as well as claims over
which national courts are deemed to have exclusive jurisdiction, such as labor
and employment. 78 While these rules generally preclude an arbitrator from
adjudicating such issues, 79 they do not ensure that Italian or French mandatory
law will be applied, for example, in the adjudication of a case by a U.S.
court.

80

In addition to protecting areas of substantive law imbued with national
interests, many systems, particularly those with a civil law tradition, prohibit
arbitrators from performing what are considered to be public functions, such as
swearing in witnesses 8 1 or ordering provisional remedies. 82 Some countries
have expressly prohibited arbitrators from imposing sanctions. For example,
the arbitration law of Sweden prohibits arbitrators from imposing conditional
fines or otherwise using "compulsory measures" to obtain evidence. 83 A
justification for prohibitions against these activities is that they are public
functions and are therefore only properly administered by government agents.
jurisdiction's mandatory laws. Joachim Zekoll, The Enforceability of American Money Judgments
Abroad. A Landmark Decision by the German Federal Court of Justice, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
641, 644 (1992) (reporting on the Bundesgerichtshof's decision to enforce a tort judgment that included
the pain and suffering portion, but not the punitive damages).
76 A complete exploration of the relative effectiveness of international arbitration in enforcing
mandatory law claims is beyond the scope of this Article and is best evaluated after much needed
empirical research on the issue has been undertaken and completed. Inevitably, the answer to this
empirical question will strongly be influenced by matters unrelated to the substance of the claims, such as
where the losing party's assets are located.
77 CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.P.C.] art. 806 (Italy).
78 Yves Derains & Rosabel E. Goodman-Everard, France, in 2 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Fr.-14 to Fr.-15 (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 2002).
Despite the fact that Paris is the headquarters of the ICC-the most important international arbitration
institution-domestic French law is particularly hostile toward arbitration. As a matter of public policy,
arbitration agreements between merchants or professionals and consumers are invalid. Id. at Fr.-7.
79 Notably, arbitrators are permitted some leeway under French law in adjudicating "private law
consequences" of alleged violations of European Economic Community competition law. Id. at Fr.-15.
80 McConnaughay, supra note 2, at 482-494 & 483 n. 122 (noting that mandatory national law can
be displaced by foreign courts, as well as by arbitral tribunals).
81 In Europe, arbitrators generally do not administer oaths to testifying witnesses because it is
considered a usurpation of judicial prerogatives and potentially exposes arbitrators to sanctions. CRAIG
ETAL., supra note 62, § 25.01.
82 Id. § 8.07 (noting that "some countries' laws expressly reserve the judge's prerogatives of
granting provisional relief even when the dispute is subject to arbitration").
83 ARBITRATION ACT OF 1999 § 25 (Swed.), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Sweden: Annex 1-6 (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 2002).
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Perhaps because U.S. law does not draw the Continent's sharper distinction
84
between the private and public spheres, the shift from early judicial reticence
to modem accommodation of arbitration has been smoother. Continued debate
and disagreement over the advisability of entrusting arbitrators with mandatory
claims or public law functions may have important consequences for my
proposal, however, which would entrust many aspects of ethical rule
development and primary enforcement to actors within the international
arbitration system, with national courts performing control and monitoring
85
functions.
Another public function about which there are significant divisions is the
limit of arbitrator power to award punitive damages. Even within the United
States, there has been significant judicial disagreement about whether
arbitrators have the power to impose punitive damages. The highest court in
New York rejects the idea that arbitrators can award punitive damages, 8 6 while
other courts permit such power.8 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has held that
arbitrators have the authority to award punitive damages if an arbitration clause
explicitly or implicitly gives an arbitrator that authority, or if the clause is
otherwise ambiguous on the issue. 88
Meanwhile, most civil law countries, such as France, Germany, and
Switzerland, do not allow any recovery of punitive damages in civil cases at
all, whether adjudicated by judge or arbitrator.8 9 Sanctions that are punitive in
nature can be awarded only by judges presiding over criminal proceedings,
which exclude judges presiding in civil cases and therefore, by extension,
arbitrators in civil cases. 90 The basis for, wisdom of, and limits on arbitrators'
84 Carbonneau, supra note 2, at 1947. The precise reasons for the early common law hostility
toward arbitration are unknown, but some scholars surmise that they can be traced back to the English
judges' almost complete reliance on fees from cases for their income, which meant arbitrators were
unwelcome competitors. John R. Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for
Enhanced Accommodations of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C. L. REv. 219, 224 (1986). A second
possible reason is that courts struggled for centuries for jurisdiction and are consequently unwilling to
surrender it. Id; see also Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 983 & n.14

(2d Cir. 1942).
85 See infra Part II.A-C.

86 In a famous opinion on the subject, the New York Court of Appeals held that arbitrators have no
power to award punitive damages, even if the parties contractually agreed to confer such power on the
arbitrator. Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 793, 794 (N.Y. 1976). In strident terms, the court
reasoned that allowing arbitrators to award punitive damages would displace the court and jury, and
therefore the state as the engine for imposing social sanctions. Id. at 796. The court also expressed
concern that punitive damage awards in arbitration would be unreviewable and impervious to the
protections provided by trial and appellate powers of remittitur. Id. The Garrity rule has since been
limited by the U.S. Supreme Court, which held that New York's prohibition against punitive damages in
international arbitration may be preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act (which permits arbitrators to
make such awards) if the parties contractually agree to "include claims for punitive damages within the
issues to be arbitrated." Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995).
87 Most other U.S. states permit arbitrators to award punitive damages in commercial cases. E.g.,
Gateway Tech., Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993, 999 (5th Cir. 1995); see Thomas J.
Stipanowich, Punitive Damages in Arbitration:Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered,66 B.U. L. REV.
953, 1002 n.266 (1986) ("Medieval merchant tribunals provide an ancient precedent for awards of
punitive damages outside the courts of law." (quoting I. GROSS, SELECT CASES ON THE LAW MERCHANT
102-03 (1908))).
88 Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 61-62 (1995).
89 John Y. Gotanda, Awarding Punitive Damages In InternationalCommercial Arbitrations in the
Wake OfMastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 38 HARv. INT'L L.J. 59, 66 & n.35 (1997).
90 Id; see also Buxbaum, supra note 74, at 251 (describing the tremendous foreign hostility toward
treble damage awards produced in U.S. antitrust litigation and the foreign legislative reactions, which
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power to impose punitive damages continue to inspire great scholarly debate
all around the world. 9 1 This debate is important for international arbitration
because, under U.S. law, punitive damages are viewed as a justification for
relegating primary enforcement of certain mandatory law claims, such as
92
claims based on securities and antitrust regulations, to national courts.
Because these concerns about arbitrators awarding punitive damages may
affect implementation of my proposal, which contemplates empowering
arbitrators to sanction attorneys for misconduct, I will respond to them more
specifically in Part III.
C. NationalInterests in Regulating Attorneys in InternationalArbitration
Any attempt to construct mechanisms for regulating attorneys in
international arbitration must justify its allocation of the various enforcement
powers. As discussed above, many of these justifications will be tied to the
relative institutional competence of the actors and structural needs of the
system. Based on the foregoing examination of analogous areas of mandatory
law and punitive damages, it is probable that efforts to locate regulatory
functions in the arbitration system will also encounter reluctance from national
legal systems. This Part identifies the state's interests in regulating attorneys
and examines how those interests play out in the international arbitration
context.
In national legal systems, the goals of ethical regulation are to guide,
punish, and deter attorney conduct in an effort to protect clients and third
parties, and to ensure the proper functioning of the state adjudicatory
apparatus. 93 While these are the direct objects of attorney regulation,
regulation also serves several ancillary functions. Regulation contributes to
public debate about the proper role and conduct of attorneys and enhances the
image of regulators, the legal profession, and the legal system. 94 The
include blocking states and refusals to enforce such judgments); Michael G. Mckinnon, FederalJudicial
and Legislative Jurisdiction Over Entities Abroad.- The Long-Arm of U.S. Antitrust Law and Viable
Solutions Beyond the Timberlane/RestatementComity Approach, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1219, 1251 (1994).
91 See generally Clifford Larsen, Punitive Damages in International Commercial Arbitration:
Adapting U.S. Policy to InternationalNorms, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION INTHE 21 ST CENTURY:
TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 245 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds.,
1994); M. Scott Donahey, Punitive Damages in InternationalCommercialArbitration, 10 J. INT'L ARB.
67 (1993); Glower W. Jones, Punitive Damages as an Arbitration Remedy, 4 J. INT'L ARB. 35 (June
1987); Andrew B. Koslow, The Arbitrator s Power to Award PunitiveDamages in InternationalContract
Actions, 19 N.YU. J. INT'L L. & POL. 203 (1986); Karen J. Tolson, Punitive Damage Awards in
InternationalArbitration: Does the "Safety Valve" of Public Policy Render Them Unenforceable in
ForeignStates?, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 455 (1987).
92 Buxbaum, supra note 74, at 252-53. By current estimates, ninety percent of all antitrust
enforcement is through private litigation and arbitration. Lucio Lanucara, The GlobalizationofAntitrust
Enforcement: Governance Issues and Legal Responses, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 453 n.73
(2002).
93 "The purpose of lawyer discipline ... is to maintain appropriate standards of professional
conduct in order to protect the public and the administration of justice from lawyers who have
demonstrated by their conduct that they are unable or likely to be unable to properly discharge their
professional duties." JOINT COMM. ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, App. JUDGES' CONE. & STANDING COMM.
ON PROF'L DISCIPLINE, AM. B. ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR LAWYER DISCIPLINE AND DISABILITY
PROCEEDINGS 1 (1978).
94 Fred C. Zacharias, Who Can Best Regulate the Ethics of Federal Prosecutors,or Who Should
Regulate the Regulators?: Response to Little, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 429, 448 & n.82 (1996) (describing
the various functions of attorney regulation); Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W.
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construction of a regulatory regime for international arbitration must take into
account these interests if it is to receive necessary support from national
systems. National interests in the international arbitration context, however,
are different in nature and decidedly narrower in range than they are in
domestic contexts.
There is less of a need for protection of clients in international commercial
arbitration because the parties are almost without exception international
business entities. There are no personal injury victims, no civil rights
claimants, and no criminal defendants.95 As participants in the global
marketplace, the consumers of international commercial arbitration
presumably have significant financial resources 96 and are sophisticated.97
They have the means to invest in evaluating lawyer conduct and can demand
loyalty in exchange for future business. 98 Thus, the primary forms of agency
problems against which disciplinary regimes protect (such as overbilling,
professional incompetence, and conflicts of interest) 99 do not pose significant
threats to the clients who employ lawyers to perform international arbitration
services. Indeed, the concern is that large corporate clients can demand loyalty
at a level that precludes or deters attorneys from maintaining obligations that
benefit third parties. 100
Third party interests, however, are also less threatened by potential abuse
in international arbitration than they are in domestic litigation. International
arbitration cases involve predominantly private, consensual, commercial
disputes.101 Because of these features, third parties are much less vulnerable to
potential misconduct by lawyers in arbitration. Consent creates arbitral
jurisdiction, which means that arbitral decisions generally are not binding on
entities that are not party to the arbitration agreement.10 2 As a consequence,
RES. L. REv. 665, 675-77 (1994) (citing public debate over appropriate confidentiality mandates and role
of articulated regulations in debate).
95 Although most parties in "commercial arbitration" are businesses, occasionally national
governments and governmental entities are parties. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 62, § 1.04 (noting that in
1976 one-third of all ICC arbitrations may have involved governmental entities; the number is somewhat
lower by more recent estimates).
96 One indicator of the caliber of businesses using the international arbitration system is the value
of cases submitted for resolution. In 1999, 34.9% of the cases submitted to the ICC involved amounts in
excess of $1 million, and 19.8% in excess of $10 million. CRAIG ET AL., supra note 62, § 1.03. It is
estimated that in the last ten years, there have been more than a dozen cases valued at over $1 billion. Id.
97 For this reason, unlike other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, international commercial
arbitration does not need to consider procedures and ethical rules protections for disempowered
participants. Cf Richard Delgado et. al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L REV. 1359, 1360-61 (discussing the claim that informal
dispute resolution mechanisms injure the poor and disempowered generally).
98 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 817 (describing how corporate clients have
experience, access to information, and resources "to devote to the task of understanding and evaluating
lawyer conduct").
99 Id. at 819-820.
100 For example, Ron Gilson postulates that the reduction in information asymmetry between
corporate clients and their lawyers has reduced the ability of outside firms to act as "gatekeepers" by
constraining their clients' desire to engage in strategic litigation. Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolution of the
Legal Profession: A DemandSide Perspective,49 MD. L. REv. 869, 900-01 (1990).
101 Like many other signatories, the United States limits the application of the New York
Convention to "commercial" disputes. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-202 (1997).
102 As a general rule, nonsignatories are not bound by and cannot invoke an arbitration clause. In
recent years, however, some exceptions have arisen, including exceptions for parent companies of
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the risk that attorney misconduct during proceedings could adversely affect
third parties is much lower in international arbitration than in traditional
national litigation. Witnesses, another class of third parties often referred to as
the targets of ethical protections, 103 are also less vulnerable as a group in
international arbitration. Proceedings are private, which limits potential
embarrassment from abusive discovery tactics or cross-examination, and
witnesses cannot normally be compelled to testify.1O4
To the extent that arbitral proceedings implicate or affect third parties,
states are not well positioned to regulate against potential attorney misconduct
that might affect such parties. International arbitrations are most often
05
conducted in states in which the attorneys for the parties are not licensed.l
The third parties most likely to be affected are also likely to be located outside
of either the host jurisdiction or the jurisdiction in which the attorney is
licensed. As some commentators have described in the context of other types
of regulation aimed at protecting foreign "victims":
[N]ations should not generally be permitted to regulate on behalf of the
welfare of people, or to protect the environment, in places outside their
jurisdictions. Domestic authorities are not well positioned to assess the
traditions and needs of foreign citizens, nor are they easily accountable
for the effects of their decisions in foreign territory. 106
Under this reasoning, bar associations or legislatures in the United States, for
example, would not be well suited to the task of promulgating ethical rules
designed to protect the interests of Cambodian or Peruvian parties affected by
the conduct of U.S. attorneys.
Finally, national legal systems are also less vulnerable to institutional
damage from attorney misconduct in international arbitration. Under the New
York Convention, the role of domestic courts is to enforce awards with only
minimal consideration given to the substance of the award and how it was

signatories, states whose agencies are signatories, and beneficiaries of an arbitration agreement.
REISMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 681-82.
103 A. Darby Dickerson, The Law and Ethics of Civil Depositions, 57 MD. L. REV. 273, 297-99
(1998) (discussing Model Rule provisions that provide protection for witnesses).
104 Marianne Roth, False Testimony in International Commercial Arbitration: A Comparative
View, 7 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 147, 151 (1994) (noting that witness participation in international
arbitration is usually voluntary and no legal obligation to testify exists unless compelled by a public
court). National courts do not ordinarily compel testimony in arbitrations occurring in foreign
jurisdictions. For example, U.S. district courts have the power to compel testimony or document
production by a person within their jurisdictions for use "in a proceeding in a foreign or international
tribunal," but this power does not extend to arbitrations. National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 165 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 1999). Witnesses present in the jurisdiction where an
arbitration occurs can, however, sometimes be compelled by national courts to testify in arbitrations.
See, e.g., Thomas Carbonneau, A Comment on the 1996 United Kingdom Arbitration Act, 22 TUL.
MAR. L.J. 131, 135 (1998) (noting that § 43 of the English Arbitration Act provides that courts can
compel witnesses to attend international arbitrations).
105 Rogers, supra note 4, at 342 & n. 1. It is not uncommon, however, for parties to retain local
counsel, particularly if they may eventually need to resort to national courts for provisional remedies.
106 John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV.
511,584 (2000).
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rendered. 107 Explicit constraints on national courts' powers inevitably deflect
criticism against national courts for particular arbitral outcomes.
Even if diminished, however, nation-states retain some interest in
protecting clients, third parties, and domestic legal order from attorney
misconduct in international arbitration. The threat that corporate clients will
replace irresponsible attorneys may deter misconduct prospectively, but it is
neither a complete deterrent nor an adequate remedy once misconduct has
occurred. Third parties may be less exposed to harm in international
commercial arbitration, but they are not completely insulated, particularly with
respect to opposing parties. Finally, even if domestic courts are not
responsible for direct administration of the proceedings, they can be debased
by ratifying an award produced by a corrupt and unfair process.
The construction of any regime for regulating attorneys in international
arbitration must take into account the interests of clients, third parties, and
nation-states. The limited nature of these interests has already been implicitly
acknowledged by national systems, which have been reluctant to regulate
extraterritorially.
Instead, national systems support efforts to develop
international ethical regulation. A brief review of the current state of
international regulation of attorneys will demonstrate this implicit abdication.
D. The Limits of CurrentInternationalEthical Regulation
The problems caused by the absence of regulation of cross-border and
international legal practice have become something of an obsession for
scholars and regulators. 108 Problems arise in cross-border practice because two
sovereigns (one in the attorney's home jurisdiction and the other in the host
jurisdiction) compete to regulate attorneys. States have the power to regulate
all activities occurring within their borders, including professional legal
activities, 109 consistent with the principle of territoriality. With respect to their
ethical rules, states can also assert prescriptive jurisdictionl' 0 over a nationally
licensed attorney acting outside of its boundaries based on principles of
nationality.'
When multiple states have legitimate power to, and an interest
in, regulating the same conduct, there is a risk that an attorney will be subject
107 Park, supra note 62, at 701.
108 See, e.g., Vagts, supra note 5, at 250; Malini Majumdar, Ethics in the InternationalArena: The
Need for Clarification, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 439, 447-49 (1995); Smit, supra note 62, at 22;
Toulmin, supra note 34, at 673-85; Robert M. Jarvis, Cross-BorderLegal Practiceand Ethics Rule 48.5: Why GreaterGuidance is Needed, 72 FLA. B.J. 59, 59-60 (1998); see also Hunter, supra note 6, at
220 (discussing an effort to create a code of ethics for international arbitrators).
109 Territoriality is the preeminent basis for prescriptive jurisdiction in the area of legal ethics,
meaning that a state "can regulate the conduct of persons who appear in their courts, maintain offices, or
conduct other transactions within its territory." Detlev Vagts, ProfessionalResponsibility in Transborder
Practice, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 677, 689 (2000). Nationality of the attorneys or bar association
membership are also prevalent bases for jurisdiction. Id. at 689-90.
110 The Restatement of Foreign Relations defines prescriptive jurisdiction as the authority of a state
"to make its law applicable to the activities, relations, or status of persons, or the interests of persons in
things, whether by legislation, by executive act or order, by administrative rule or regulation, or by
determination of a court." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401 (a) (2002).
111 See Vagts, supra note 109, at 689-90 and accompanying text.
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to conflicting obligations. The problem is exacerbated in the international
context where "[w]hat is appropriate, even mandatory, under one regime may
not be, and may indeed be even reprehensible under another." 12
U.S. and European regulators have attempted to address some of the
problems that arise in cross-border and international practice. With the most
difficult and intractable problems, they have often resorted to choice-of-law
rules, although not always successfully. 113 When they turned their attention to
the context of adjudication, regulators agreed that the choice-of-law rule
should require attorneys to abide by the rules of any tribunal before which they
are appearing. 1 4 This solution is necessarily premised on assumptions that
adjudicatory tribunals have (or should have) their own ethical norms, that
attorneys appearing before them should be bound by those rules, and that those
tribunals have the power to enforce their rules.' 1 5 These assumptions reveal
the implicit acknowledgement that to be fully operational, adjudicatory
systems must have the tools and the accompanying power to regulate
participating attorneys.11 6 The fact that international arbitration is a private
system does nothing to diminish this inherent need.
The implicit acknowledgement that national ethical rules should not be
stretched to apply extraterritorially to foreign or international tribunals is
consistent with bar associations' demonstrated disinterest in enforcing their
substantive ethical rules in international arbitration.
Under traditional
international law doctrines, enforcement jurisdiction is expressly premised not
only on the existence of prescriptive jurisdiction, but also on the assertion of

112 Karl Carstens, Preface to Ivo G CAYTAS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PRACTICE: CONFLICTS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1992) (page numbers not provided in preface); see also Vagts, supra
note 109, at 677 (noting the increasing problems because attorneys are subject to the rule of "different bar
authorities [that] lay down quite different rules within their jurisdictions").
113 See, e.g., Louise L. Hill, Lawyer Publicity in the European Union: Bans Are Removed But
BarriersRemain, 29 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 381, 443 (1995) (noting that the CCBE's general
principle on personal publicity does not designate which jurisdictional rule applies when inconsistencies
arise between the rules of the host state and the home state); see also Jarvis, supra note 108, at 59; Mary
C. Daly, Resolving Ethical Conflicts in MultijurisdictionalPractice-IsModel Rule 8.5 the Answer an
Answer or No Answer at All?, 36 S. TEX. L. REv. 715, 720 (1995). Notably, U.S. Model Rule 8.5

regulates cross-border practice, but expressly disavows any application in the international context: "The
choice of law provision [in Rule 8.5] is not intended to apply to transnational practice. Choice of law in
this context should be the subject of agreements between jurisdictions or of appropriate international
law." Id. at 757 n.171. The problem is that there does not appear to be any such international law or
agreements. Vagts, supra note 7, at 378.
114 Roger J. Goebel, The Liberalization of Interstate Legal Practice in the European Union:

Lessonsfor the United States?, 34 INT'L LAW. 307, 343 (2000).

115 For example, CCBE Rule 4.1, which requires that lawyers who appear before a court or
tribunal in a member state comply with the rules of conduct applied in that court, is analogous to Model
Rule 3.4(c), which prohibits knowing disobedience of rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based
on an assertion that no rated obligation exists. Terry, supra note 34, at 386-87. Similarly, the CCBE
Code permits the tribunal exercising jurisdiction to determine the level of ex parte communications that
are permissible, which implies the expectation that tribunals can and do regulate such aspects of attorney
conduct. For further discussion of these issues, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 392.
116 In the United States, only a few states have attempted to make their ethical rules directly
applicable in arbitration. See, e.g., Disciplinary Rules of the Code of Prof Responsibility, N.Y. JUD.
LAW, app. (McKinney Supp. 1991) (containing a single statement in the appendix to the effect that rules
apply in alternative dispute resolution settings as well). For extended discussion, see Rogers, supra note
4, at 392.
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that jurisdiction.1 7 On an intuitive level, common sense tells us that the
plenary power to enforce presumes that the object of enforcement is the
nation's own laws. 118 It remains theoretically possible that national institutions
could be entrusted with enforcement of international legal ethics; but, for the
reasons described below]1 9 and as a practical matter, national institutions are
less well-suited to the task. In fact, national bar associations rarely, if ever,
venture into the international enforcement realm. 120 Thus, while it is clear that
national legal systems will continue to have some interest in monitoring the
conduct of attorneys licensed by them and participating in arbitrations that
occur on their soil or whose awards they must enforce, those interests need not
be accommodated by relying on national institutions for primary enforcement.
II.

MAKING ETHICS BINDING AND ENFORCEABLE IN INTERNATIONAL

ARBITRATION
Having described a model for developing an enforcement regime and the
competing interests that must be accommodated in applying that model, this
Part undertakes the constructive process. Although I have been referring to
this undertaking as a singular task, enforcement of professional ethics is
composed of many necessary subtasks, including making ethical norms
binding on the parties and their counsel, interpreting the rules, detecting
violations, determining guilt for violations, fashioning remedies and sanctions,
and enforcing those sanctions. 121 I propose a regime that assigns these
subtasks to various actors based on their relative institutional competence and
fit within the institutional structure of the international arbitration system. In
Part III, I address some of the most significant arguments that may be raised if

117 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 401(3) (1987) (defining enforcement
jurisdiction as a state's power to "induce or compel compliance... with its laws or regulations").
118 The international law argument regarding the dependence of enforcement jurisdiction on
prescriptive jurisdiction should not be confused with domestic legal ethics debates about whether the
enforcement authority of an institution naturally follows from its legislative authority. Wilkins, How
Should We Determine, supra note 21, at 470 (arguing that, in the domestic context, authority to
promulgate ethical rules does not necessarily imply that the power to enforce those rules should be vested
in the same institution).
119 See infra notes 178-189 and accompanying text.
120 CAYTAS, supra note 13, at 3.
121 Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L.
REv. 33, 38 (1996). At a national level, these subtasks are performed not only by ethical codes enforced
by local bar associations, but also by a range of other institutions, including courts (which work with bar
associations and enforce rules of procedure, civil malpractice claims, and criminal statutes), insurance
companies, market pressures, and influence from peers. Id. at 35-36. For example, in the United States,
much of the conduct regulated in ethical codes is also regulated by statute. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990) (prohibiting an attorney from disclosing client confidences after
representation has ended). For analysis of how norms that are not reflected in formal jurisprudence can
still effectively regulate behavior, see W. Michael Reisman, Lining Up: The Microlegal System of
Queues, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 417, 432 (1985). See also ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:
How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4-6, 137-55 (1991). See generally W. Michael Reisman, Looking,
Staring and Glaring: Microlegal Systems and the Public Order, 12 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 165
(1983) [hereinafter Reisman, Looking, Staring] (discussing how informal norms can govern behavior).
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a struggle emerges for control over attorney regulation in the international
arbitration context.
A. ArbitralInstitutionsas Promulgators
As I established in a separate article, the ethical rules that bind lawyers in
adjudicatory contexts are inextricably linked with procedural rules that order
those contexts. 122 As a consequence, the contents of any ethical code for
international commercial arbitration must be tailored to the procedural
arrangements that govern the conduct of arbitrations. The difficulty caused by
this prescription, however, is that the procedures used in any particular
arbitration depend on which arbitral rules and institutions are selected by the
parties,123 on individually negotiated supplemental rules agreed to by the
parties (such as the IBA hybridized rules), and on any "gap-fillers" adopted by
the arbitrators. Consequently, what is needed is not a single code applied
uniformly to all international arbitrations, but multiple codes that can be
calibrated to the specific rules, traditions, and features of particular arbitration
proceedings. 124
Given the complexity of such a task, arbitral institutions enjoy the superior
institutional competence to formulate those rules. 125 Institutions such as the
ICC, LCIA, ICSID, SCC, and the Venice Court of National and International
Arbitration1 26 draft and administer the arbitral rules that regulate the initiation
and general conduct of arbitration. Accordingly, they have specialized
knowledge of the rules and their functions, 27 as well as the most direct
experience in dealing with ethical issues that arise in arbitration. Given their
direct financial interest in attracting parties 2 8 and increasing competition
among arbitral institutions to attract those parties,129 arbitral institutions have a
strong incentive to select rules that will ensure the integrity of the arbitrations
conducted under the auspices of their institution.1 30 Together, these factors
122 Rogers, supra note 4, at 385-86.
123 For examples of how trade arbitration, International Centre for Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID") arbitration, and more standard arbitration differ, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 419-22.
124 The effect of parties' ability to modify institutional rules in individual disputes will be taken up
in Part II.C, infra.

125 While not all international arbitrations are conducted under the auspices of arbitral institutions,
the overwhelming majority are. Detlev Vagts & W. Michael Reisman, International Chamber of
Commerce Arbitration, 80 AM. J. INT'L L. 268, 268 (1986) (suggesting that ad hoc arbitration has
declined in popularity because parties have traded off the "maximum suppleness" offered by ad hoc
arbitration for the predictability of institutionalized arbitration).
126 In addition to these institutions, several sets of ad hoc rules exist, the most popular being the
Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law. G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N.
CITRAL, 31 st Sess., Supp. No. 21, at 182, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976). Organizations that promulgate ad
hoc rules could, like arbitral institutions, be assigned the task of supplementing them with new ethical
rules.
127 See discussion of procedural rules contained in arbitral rules, supra note 59.
128 Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International
CommercialArbitration,33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 79, 95 (2000).

129 Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 63, at 210.
130 This reasoning admittedly conflates party preference and institutional reputation, which some
might argue is an artificial identity of interests since parties may prefer the flexibility that comes with less
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signal arbitral institutions' superior institutional competence in the task of

formulating specific ethical norms to comport with their proceedings.
In addition to ensuring a coherent fit with arbitral rules, vesting rulemaking
authority in arbitral institutions is preferable to potential alternatives because it
is consistent with the structural priorities of the international arbitration
system. Promulgating rules through a treaty, the most obvious alternative,
would engrave a single set of inflexible ethical norms into the international
arbitration system. 13 1 Aside from the potentially insurmountable difficulties in
drafting such a treaty, 132 it would be impossible to adjust treaty-based ethical
rules to respond to the varied needs of parties, as evidenced by the various
traditions and procedural arrangements within arbitral institutions and the
33
parties' individualized procedural choices.1
Examination of a concrete example highlights this problem.134 Suppose
that, in an effort to reconcile conflicting national rules regarding the
permissibility of pretestimonial communication with a witness, the drafters of
the treaty adopt an international ethical norm that permits some forms of
witness communication. This rule would be appropriate in most arbitrations
because, under the typical hybridized procedures, parties have significant
control over the presentation of evidence, including the selection and crossexamination of witnesses. 135 Under these procedural rules, a rule that permits
some pretestimonial communication is not only reasonable, but also necessary
to enable litigants to prepare their cases. 136 On the other hand, suppose that
regulation of attorney conduct. However, as described further in Part III, parties select institutions ex
ante as part of a negotiated process with their potential adversary, often without knowing the contours of
the future dispute or whether their position will be that of claimant or respondent. Together, these factors
will deter a potential race to the bottom in which parties seek to have the least limiting ethical constraints
imposed on their counsel.
131 A treaty-based solution might also be considered inconsistent with U.S. goals in regulating the
legal profession. In Europe, for example, the recently enacted treaty-based CCBE Code became effective
by adoption into local law by the legislatures of individual European states. Terry, supra note 34, at 383.
If ethical rules were enacted in treaty form like the CCBE Code, they would be a product of legislative
and executive drafting decisions under the U.S. constitutional process. In addition to injecting national
interests into the inner workings of the international arbitration system, a treaty-based solution would
have the U.S. executive and legislative branches promulgating attorney ethics, which, at least according
to some, would undermine attorney independence and ethical decisionmaking. Wilkins, Wo Should
Regulate, supra note 18, at 853.
132 For a discussion of the shortcomings of other attempts to draft treaties governing international
ethical rules and standards, and of the inherent limitations of negotiated compromise as a means for
determining appropriate ethical rules, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 395-98.
133 For a discussion on the importance of flexibility and party autonomy in arbitration, see supra
Subpart I.B.3. Theoretically, it is possible to promulgate in treaty form a set of ethical rules that is
general enough to avoid a violent collision with procedural choices (e.g., by including multiple options)
and that can be contractually modified. The question becomes, however, whether a document so general
and so flexible is really a treaty and whether there are any advantages of putting such a document into
treaty form.
134 Numerous other examples that demonstrate the relationship between procedural choices and
ethical rules are discussed in depth in Rogers, supra note 4, at 419-22.
135 Andreas F. Lowenfeld, The Elements ofProcedure: Are They Separately Portable?,45 AM. J.
COMP. L. 649, 654 (1997) ("By now, cross-examination by counsel is pretty well accepted in
international arbitrations, and for the most part the continental lawyers have learned how to do it.
Moreover, and almost as important, arbitrators have learned how to administer cross-examination ... ").
136 Cf Mirjan Damaika, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and
Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839, 847 (1997) (arguing that if civilian systems
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instead of opting for the hybridized procedures, the parties adopt procedures
based on an inquisitorial model,1 37 under which the arbitral tribunal controls
the presentation of evidence and conducts all of the questioning of witnesses.
Party communication with witnesses in this context would interfere with the
arbitrator's role,138 and the ethical rule adopted by the treaty would be
39
awkward, if not counterproductive. 1
As this example demonstrates, a treaty-based solution would not offer the
same variability and flexibility as permitting arbitral institutions to calibrate
the rules to their unique procedural settings.14 0 A treaty-based solution would
also leave the development of the international structure to the "lawyerbureaucrat" who is "attached to the policy-making machinery," producing
results that are "no longer mediated through the development of a conceptual
framework [that] is in tune with the changes of international reality."141 The
risk is that the solution will be a compromise designed to accommodate
various national interests, but in a way that cumulatively undermines the
rationality of the whole and leaves its suitability to the international arbitration
142
system in doubt.
B. ArbitralRules as Implementers
The determination of who will promulgate the new code of ethics for
international commercial arbitration portends answers to how the rules will be
promulgated and enforced. If arbitral institutions are developing the ethical
norms, the obvious method for putting those norms into practice is to
incorporate them into existing arbitral rules. When parties agree to submit
disputes to a particular arbitral institution or to adhere to the rules of a

introduced cross-examination, fairness would require at least a "minimal degree" of witness preparation).
For a discussion of the fit between ethical rules on pretestimonial communication and procedural rules
concerning witness presentation and cross-examination, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 418.
137 This outcome could also occur if the situs jurisdiction were Germany or Austria, since
arbitrators often look to the procedures of the local jurisdiction to "fill gaps" where parties cannot agree
to procedural rules. William W. Park, NationalLaw and CommercialJustice: SafeguardingProcedural
Integrity in InternationalArbitration,63 TUL. L. REV. 647, 653-54 (1989).
138 Cf John C. Reitz, Why We Probably Cannot Adopt the German Advantage in Civil Procedure,

75 IowA L. REv. 987, 994 (1990) (arguing that U.S. procedure, in which parties control presentation of
evidence, is incompatible with a German-style rule prohibiting pretrial contact with witnesses).
139 For an analysis of other examples of conflicts between particular procedural and ethical rules,
see Rogers, supra note 4, at 402-05.
140 Of course, it is theoretically possible to enact a treaty delegating, as proposed in this Article,
rulemaking and rule enforcement powers to arbitral institutions and arbitrators, but the question then
becomes what the value of such a treaty would be. One advantage might be that, while in most respects
an empty vessel, a treaty reifying the proposals of this Article could provide an opportunity to address and
overcome the potential reluctance of some states to consign to the international arbitration system
authority over a traditionally public function. For further discussion of this reluctance, see infra Part
III.B.
141 Nicholas Greenwood Onuf, GlobalLaw-Making and Legal Thought, in LAW-MAKING IN THE

GLOBAL COMMuNtTY 44-45 (Nicholas Greenwood Onuf ed., 1982) (discussing the impact of the shift
from scholars to bureaucrats in the development of international law).
142 FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF
PRACTICAL AND LEGAL REASONING N INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS 12 (1995).
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particular institution, the arbitral rules, and by extension the new ethical rules,
would become incorporated into the parties' contract by reference.
Incorporating ethical rules into the parties' contract has two important
consequences. First, like other contract terms (including arbitral rules), arbitral
ethics would be default settings modifiable by the parties, at least within
certain limitations that will be taken up later. 143 Parties would have an
opportunity to modify the default ethical norms either at the time the
underlying contract is drafted or, as is more likely, early in the arbitral
proceedings. 44 The ability to modify rules, even if they are already calibrated
to the procedures of specific arbitral institutions, is necessary because
procedural rules are not entirely fixed by the arbitral institutions and are
subject to modification by the parties.145 To provide meaningful guidance
when parties can contractually modify the procedural arrangements, ethical
rules must be similarly modifiable.
The other important consequence of making ethical rules part of the
parties' contract is that, like the terms of the arbitration agreement, ethical rules
would become separate contractual obligations, the breach of which could give
rise to separate claims for liability. 146 As described in more detail below, the
contractual nature of arbitral ethical rules will suggest mechanisms for
enforcement that are integral to the international arbitration system.
C. Arbitratorsas PrimaryEnforcers

If ethical rules are adopted by parties and incorporated into their
agreements along with arbitral rules, then arbitrators become the most obvious
mechanism for primary enforcement.
International arbitrators must be
empowered to impose sanctions for misconduct that occurs during proceedings
in violation of adopted ethical rules. This Part will address the relative
143 For a discussion of the limitations on the parties' power to modify, see infra Subpart III.A.2.
144 In drafting arbitration clauses, parties rarely address procedural issues. Howard M. Holtzmann,
Balancing the Need for Certainty and Flexibility in International Arbitration Procedures, in
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION IN THE 21 ST CENTuRY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY?

3, 10-11 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N. Brower eds., 1993) (citing study by Stephen Bond, former
Secretary-General of the ICC International Court of Arbitration, in which only one of 452 arbitration
clauses submitted to the ICC referred to specific procedures).
145 Virtually all arbitral rules and most modem national arbitration statutes give parties broad
powers to determine procedural rules jointly. If the parties fail to agree, arbitrators have the power to
determine procedure.
PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, EMMANUEL GAILLARD & BERTHOLD GOLDMAN,
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD, GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION

1257 (Emmanuel

Gaillard & John Savage eds., 1999).

146 There is no claim or cause of action for failure to "comply" with an arbitrator's award, and in
fact parties contest the awards with some degree of regularity. The parties' agreement to abide by an
arbitral award is more akin to a "confession ofjudgment" than to an arbitration agreement. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 293 (7th ed. 1999) (defining "confession of judgment" as an agreement to "the entry
of judgment upon the occurrence or nonoccurrence of an event"). Parties are, however, through an
arbitration agreement, bound to submit disputes to arbitration. The remedy for breach of that obligation
is most often specific performance (a court will refer a matter to arbitration). E.g., 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2002). It
is also possible that damages might arise out of a claim for breach, the value of which being the added
cost of enforcing the agreement. Julius Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New FederalArbitrationLaw, 12
VA. L. REv. 265, 276 (1926) ("[F]rom earliest times it was held that for a breach of an arbitration
agreement the aggrieved party was entitled to damages."), quoted in Margaret M. Harding, The
Redefinition ofArbitration by Those with SuperiorBargainingPower, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 857, 858 n. 12.
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institutional competence of arbitrators over national alternatives, leaving for
Part III a discussion of the potential opposition to such a power.
1. The ComparativeInstitutionalAdvantages ofArbitrator-Enforcers
In comparison to national bar associations, arbitrators have superior
institutional competence to act as the first line of attorney ethical regulation.
Like their judicial counterparts in domestic litigation, arbitrators enjoy certain
"information advantages" because of their direct role in the arbitral process.147
During the ordinary course of proceedings, arbitrators have an opportunity to
observe and evaluate an attorney's conduct in context. 148 Moreover, arbitrators
have a stake in the integrity of the process. Arbitrators develop reputations in
part based on their ability to control proceedings and render fair and expedient
results.149 These reputations will affect whether arbitrators are selected to
serve on future panels, which means arbitrators have a strong incentive to
protect the integrity of proceedings against attorney misconduct.150 As will be
discussed later, arbitrators are so well-positioned to perform a control function,
it is likely that they are already doing so at an informal level through their
procedural decisions in regulating the proceedings, in making their substantive
decisions in favor of or against certain parties, and in awarding costs and
fees. 151

As noted above,152 national bar associations, which usually have primary
and plenary power to discipline lawyers in national settings, have essentially
abdicated responsibility for regulating attorneys in the context of international
arbitration. While the motivations for this hands-off approach are not clear,
and probably vary, it may be that local bar associations recognize that they
would not be particularly effective at disciplining extraterritorial conduct of
international advocates. Although national bar associations are a viable
147 See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 835 (describing the benefits of having
disciplinary mechanisms integrated into the areas in which lawyers work).
148 See id
149 YvEs DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND

THE CONSRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 159 (1996) (noting the importance of an elite
reputation to international commercial arbitrators); cf Eric A. Posner, Arbitration and the Harmonization
of International Commercial Law: A Defense of Mitsubishi, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 647, 668 (1999)
(reviewing research that demonstrates that arbitrators are deeply concerned about their professional

reputations).
150 It must be acknowledged that the incentives may also, as some have argued, have the opposite

effect if arbitrators avoid sanctioning counsel who they think are likely to bring future business their way.
Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 107 (1983). See
generally, McConnaughay, supra note 2 (discussing the inherent lawlessness of the international

arbitration system and the problem of arbitrators being beholden to private parties). Because
international arbitrations most often match two large international companies, this potential
counterincentive is less likely to be a problem in the international setting than it might be in domestic
arbitration, where individual plaintiffs are often pitted against large companies. Indeed, in domestic
arbitration, the need for a sanction power for arbitrators is less compelling (given the proximity of
national bar associations) and it may only enhance the already perverted incentive structure encountered
by plaintiffs arbitrating against repeat players.
151 For a discussion of arbitrators' exercise of these powers, and the problems caused by the fact
that this de facto sanction power is not explicit, see infra notes 265-270 and accompanying text.
152 See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
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recourse for clients of a misbehaving attorney, the most probable victims of
misconduct in the adjudicatory context are the opposing party and its counsel.
As Wilkins explains, bar associations are less effective than institutional
controls in regulating the externality problems generated in advocacy
settings.15 3 Even in domestic settings, it is rare that opposing parties lodge
complaints with bar authorities, in part because of the virtually nonexistent
possibility of recovering compensation for their efforts. 154 When the burden
on the opposing party involves the added difficulty and expense of lodging a
complaint with a foreign bar association, the potential for viable regulation is
dramatically less.155 On the other hand, because the threat of penalties from an
arbitral tribunal would be meaningful, instead of remote and improbable, it
may have a deterrent effect on the behavior of attorneys. 156
2.

StructuralPreferencefor Arbitrator-Enforcers

In addition to the superior institutional competence that arbitrators enjoy
over national alternatives, vesting them with primary enforcement authority
also serves the structural goals of the international arbitration system)57 As
described below, if national institutions were to apply ethical rules in
individual cases, several interrelated problems would arise.
The first type of problem, which I will refer to as the fragmentation
problem, regards the substantive integrity of the international rules. Primary
enforcement authority over international ethical rules necessarily includes the
power to interpret the meaning and scope of those rules. If this power is vested
in national institutions, there is a substantial if not inevitable risk that they will
distort the rules by assigning to them their own national "substantive tilt."158
This type of distortion has been noted in cases in which national courts have
applied international norms, 159 as well as in analogous cases in which national

153 Cf Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 835-43 (addressing the relative costs and
benefits of institutional control of attorney conduct).
154 In the United States, bar associations "generally will not impose fines that compensate
complainants." Deborah L. Rhode, InstitutionalizingEthics, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 665, 705 (1994).
155 But see Richard L. Abel, The Future of the Legal Profession: TransnationalLaw Practice,44
CASE W. RES. L. REv. 737, 762-63 (1994), for a respectable dissenting opinion arguing that victims of
misconduct are capable of seeking out bar review boards even in foreign countries.
156 In this way, ethical duties in international commercial arbitration are like other duties in
international law. See Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The PrescribingFunction in the
World Constitutive Process:How InternationalLaw is Made, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 355, 377
(Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981) (opining that a prescription of duty "is viewed

as authoritative by those [to] whom it is addressed and... its audience concludes that the prescriber...
intends to and, indeed, can make it controlling").
157 For a discussion of the role of structural limitations on development of enforcement
mechanisms, see supra Part I.B.
158 See Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 811.
159 See Eyal Benvenisti, Judicial Misgivings Regarding the Application of InternationalLaw: An

Analysis ofAttitudes of National Courts, 4 EUR. J. INT'L L. 159, 160-75 (1993) (discussing reasons that
prompt most national courts to approach international norms apprehensively and to limit their application
within national legal systems).
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regulatory authorities have applied domestic ethical rules. 160 The fragmentation
that would occur as national institutions leave their imprimatur on international
ethical rules would undercut the uniformity and neutrality that inspired the
development of international substantive ethical rules in the first place. 161
Another problem that would undermine both the neutrality and the
effectiveness of international arbitration is what I will refer to as the problem
of disruption.1 62 National courts could become involved in the ethical
regulation of attorneys in international arbitration at one of two junctures: the
national courts in the situs jurisdiction could be called on to intervene during
the proceedings, or the courts of the enforcement jurisdiction could consider
misconduct during enforcement proceedings. Both of these potential choices
would leave the arbitral process less insulated from national courts and more
vulnerable to disruption and delay.
Even putting aside the issue of possible bad faith abuse, the potential for
delay and disruption in courts in the situs jurisdiction could be significant. An
instructive corollary for such a proposal is the role of national courts in the
context of provisional remedies. Provisional remedies can be sought through
expedited procedures while arbitral proceedings continue. 163 In contrast,
national court review of ethical misconduct could not be as easily severed from
proceedings, and currently there are no procedural mechanisms in place to
provide expedited review of ethical issues. 164 In addition, many questions of
misconduct in the adversarial context are bound up with proceedings on the
merits. Did the attorney improperly withhold information that was required to
be produced? Did the attorney make a false statement to the tribunal?
While it could also be said that provisional remedies are also bound up
with the merits, 165 as their name suggests, provisional remedies are inherently
temporary. They dissolve if the arbitral tribunal reaches a conclusion on the
merits that is inconsistent with a court's provisional determination. National
court decisions regarding alleged attorney misconduct, however, would

160 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 810-11 (noting that, since enforcement
officials invariably exercise a certain amount of discretionary authority over the content of professional
norms when they apply ethical rules in particular cases, "conferring enforcement authority is tantamount
to empowering a particular set of actors to place their own interpretation on these ambiguous professional

norms").
161 See Rogers, supra note 4, at 373-78.

162 See supra Subpart I.B. I (discussing the benefits of neutrality in international arbitration).
163 See Ronald Allen Homing, Interim Measures ofProtection; Securityfor Claims and Costs; and
Commentary on the WIPO Emergency Relief Rules (In Toto).'Article 46, 9 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 155, 155
(1998) (noting that national courts typically have defined and developed procedures for hearing and
granting interim relief).
164 It is possible that national legislatures could provide for expedited review of misconduct

hearings in an effort to attract international arbitration. The obstacles to such widespread national reform
are significant, however, particularly given widely divergent national approaches to attorney regulation.

165 Although nations have different standards under which provisional remedies will be granted,

they normally require some showing that the party applying for relief has a likelihood of prevailing on the
merits and that the remedies sought will be endangered or unavailable without provisional relief. See
Homing, supra note 163, at 156.

2003

Context and InstitutionalStructure in Attorney Regulation

necessarily remain binding.166 Referring back to the earlier example, a
decision that an attorney had misrepresented a fact to the tribunal would be
based on whether the fact represented by the attorney was "true." To avoid a
potential conflict with this finding, arbitrators would need to hold their
proceedings in abeyance until the result from the national court ethical
proceeding was known. Otherwise, arbitrators would risk either having to
revise their findings based on contrary judicial determinations or to render an
award inconsistent with the court's determination.
Resorting to national courts at the enforcement stage would be an even
more problematic choice. Such review would be partial at best and, when
available, would reduce ethical enforcement to a zero-sum game. Under the
New York Convention, which severely limits the grounds upon which an award
can be denied enforcement, aggrieved parties are only able to raise challenges
to those most egregious types of misconduct that call into question the very
integrity of the tribunal's decision.167 When faced with proof of such
egregious misconduct, the only remedy that national courts could offer would
68
be refusal to enforce the award.1
In addition to the fact that misconduct can be disruptive and unfair and still
not rise to a level that can be redressed under the New York Convention, an
enforcement-based remedy imposed by national courts would only be able to
redress misconduct by the winning party. If the remedy is nonenforcement,
then a losing party could attempt to resist enforcement by making allegations
of misconduct. A winning party, however, would have no opportunity to raise
allegations of misconduct unless it was assessed costs and fees that would be
offset against its award. 169 As will be discussed in more detail below,
70
arbitrators do use the costs and fees as a de facto sanctioning mechanism.
However, the objection here is to national courts assuming the role of primary
enforcers when they cannot directly redress misconduct committed by either
party.
In sum, national courts are neither well-suited to the task of evaluating and
regulating behavior that occurred in an international arbitration, nor wellpositioned to be effective in sanctioning misconduct. Requiring them to
assume the role of primary enforcers would undermine the arbitration system's
neutrality and effectiveness and would lead to fragmentation of the
166 If national court determinations on ethical matters were treated the same as provisional
remedies, a contrary later decision by the arbitral tribunal would trump the court decision. The question
would then become: Why have judicial review at all?
167 There is no provision under the New York Convention for refusing to enforce or setting aside
an award on the basis of attorney misconduct. However, if misconduct rose to the level of fraud that
affected the tribunal's decision on the merits, arguably a challenge would render the award unenforceable
under Article V(l)(b) (precluding a party from presenting its case) or Article V(2)(b) (containing the
public policy exception). CRAIG ET AL., supra note 62, § 37, at 677-78. Clearly, though, some
misconduct could interfere with a party's ability to present its case without wholly precluding it.
168 Most national courts have no power to revise awards, even if procured by fraud, and arbitral
tribunals have only limited powers to do so. See FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 145,
11599 (discussing French law on the subject and recent developments in other states).
169 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing national courts' roles in reviewing sanction awards).
170 See infra Part III.B.3.
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international code of arbitral ethics.171 Arbitrators, meanwhile, enjoy a
superior institutional competence and have self-interested incentives to
exercise it.
D. InternationalAttorneys as Adherents and "MoralEntrepreneurs"172
Incorporating ethical norms into arbitral rules will make the ethical norms
contractually binding on the parties, but it will not make them binding on the
attorneys representing the parties. The consensual jurisdiction of arbitration
applies only to parties to the arbitration agreement, not to their legally
autonomous representatives.1 73 As a consequence, attorneys in international
arbitration are neither bound by the ethical rules that are incorporated into the
arbitral agreement, nor personally subject to any inherent sanction power of the
arbitral tribunal.] 74 This escape hatch must be closed. 175
The best way to achieve this goal is to require that attorneys who
participate in arbitral proceedings be bound personally by arbitral rules,
including the ethical requirements.176 Like the underlying arbitral agreement,
this commitment would be contractual in nature and could be secured either as
part of the procedures for commencing arbitration (i.e., as an appendix to the
Statement of Claim and Response) or during the initial meetings provided for
under most arbitral rules. 177 Arbitral rules could be amended to require that
parties ensure that their attorneys follow this procedure-even if that means
parties must replace counsel who are unwilling to accept these obligations.178
171 For a discussion of the importance of neutrality and effectiveness in the institutional structure
of the international arbitration system, see supra Part I.B. 1-2.
172 The term "moral entrepreneur" is borrowed from Dezalay and Garth's groundbreaking research
into the social context of the arbitration industry. DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 149, at 33. Richard
Posner has also adopted the term more generally to refer to genuine agents of social change who "spot [a]
discrepancy between the existing code and the changing environment and persuade the society to adopt a
new, more adaptive code." RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY
44(1999).
173 See REISMAN ET. AL., supra note 3, at 484.
174 Notably, in the Bidermann case, the court never determined whether the parties had agreed to
submit the issue of attorney disqualification to arbitration, but decided instead on the grounds of public
policy that such issues could not be submitted to arbitration. Bidermann Indus. Licensing Inc. v. Avmar
N.V., 570 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1991), discussed in Thomas, supra note 35, at 565.
175 This lacuna is particularly problematic in light of the fact that arbitrators routinely award costs
and fees, payable by the parties, on the basis of real or perceived misconduct that may entirely be the
responsibility of the parties' counsel. For further discussion of the problems raised by de facto
sanctioning mechanisms, see infra notes 2911-2977 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the
unfairness that may result from arbitrators applying their culturally determined ethical norms to behavior
deemed proper under a home jurisdiction's ethical rules, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 376-78.
176 The estimable fees to be earned in arbitration would provide sufficient pressure to ensure that
attorneys would agree to be governed by arbitral ethical norms and the sanctioning power of arbitrators.
177 For example, under the ICC Rules, after the arbitral tribunal is chosen, one of the first events
prescribed by the rules is a hearing at which the parties and the arbitrators draw up a document called the
"Terms of Reference." This document spells out the issues in dispute and the procedures for adjudicating
those issues. CRAIG ETAL., supra note 62, § 15.01, at 251.
178 Accountability to the arbitral tribunal should not be objectionable, since it is comparable to
other adjudicatory settings in which attorneys are subject to the power ofjudges and bound by the forum
jurisdiction's ethical norms. For example, a U.S. attorney licensed in California who appears in a Nevada
court must, after obtaining permission to appear pro hoc vice, abide by Nevada ethical rules and is liable
to Nevada and California bar authorities for transgressions. Marcia L. Proctor, Ethics in Adversarial
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Subjecting attorneys to ethical regulation will have the further effect of
drafting them into service as co-sponsors of the development of the ethical
regime for international arbitration.1 79 Traditionally, the anticipated risk
associated with the creation of "global attorneys" has been that, with the
moorings of national legal systems removed, the world will be left with a
generation of stateless lawyers instead of a disciplined and integrated global
legal profession.180 My proposal avoids this potential hazard by requiring
practicing attorneys to actively contribute to the development of ethics when
they draft arbitral agreements, make arguments for adopting or enforcing
particular norms, and decide whether to observe prevailing ethical norms in
their professional conduct.181 Forcing them to accept a stake in the outcome of
these developments will enhance the quality of their participation by
formalizing their role as moral entrepreneurs in this realm.
E. Published SanctionAwards as Explicators

Arbitrators' new sanction power should be implemented through what I
will call sanction awards. When allegations of misconduct are brought,
arbitrators should conduct a factual investigation and provide the accused
attorney with an opportunity to be heard.182 If the arbitral tribunal determines
that a violation has occurred, the tribunal would publish the relevant findings
in a reasoned sanction award183 that imposes a fine and, if appropriate, refers
the matter to the attorney's local bar association.1 84 In the event that no
misconduct is found, the tribunal would nevertheless prepare an advisory
opinion articulating the basis for that finding. This enforcement mechanism is
Practice,69 AM. JUR. 2D Trials § 12 (1999). Likewise, a French attorney appearing in a German court
may have to abide by German ethical rules and be liable to German authorities for transgressions. See
Terry, supra note 34, at 362-63.
179 "By collectively engaging in the process of enacting and enforcing rules of pr6fessional
conduct, lawyers develop and reinforce the disposition for moral decisionmaking." Wilkins, Who Should
Regulate, supra note 18, at 863.
180 "While it is sound from a business perspective, the concept [of the global lawyer] carries with it
the danger of professional statelessness, a condition in which lawyers over time become disassociated
from the legal profession's fundamental values, such as lawyer independence." Mary C. Daly, The
Cultural,Ethical and Legal Challenges in Lawyeringfor a Global Organization:The Role of the General
Counsel,46 EMORY L.J. 1057, 1111 (1997).
181 See Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, Putting Law Back into the Sociology of Lawyers, in
LAWYERS IN SOCIETY 281, 287 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis eds., 1995) ("It hardly needs
argument today that law and lawyers create [a legal] culture as well as being its creatures."); cf Robert
Briner, The Role of Lawyers in ADR, in GLOBAL LAW IN PRACTICE 243, 246-47 (J. Ross Harper ed.,
1997) (noting that some observers describe lawyers as influencing the progress and shape of ADR).
182 In the analogous context of Rule 11 of the U.S. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Advisory
Committee's notes suggest that the judge has considerable discretion in formulating the process to be
followed, including deciding the matter on the basis of the record and the judge's own observation of the
litigation conduct. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1337 (2d ed. Supp. 2002).
183 In many international arbitrations, substantive awards are issued with reasons. See Alan Scott
Rau, Integrity in Private Judging,38 S. TEx. L. REv. 485, 537-38 nn.183 & 188. In fact, some civil law
systems treat unreasoned awards as unenforceable violations of public policy. James T. Peter, Med-Arb
in InternationalArbitration,8 AM. REV. INT'LARB. 83, 86 & n.21 (1997).
184 While the national bar associations have abdicated responsibility for enforcing ethics in
international arbitration, it does not necessarily follow that they would be unwilling to provide support to
international enforcement efforts. See supra notes 131-137 and accompanying text.
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consistent with treating arbitral ethical rules as contractual obligations that are
enforceable through the existing mechanisms of international arbitration, but
will also require some modifications designed to accommodate the particular
needs of ethical regulation.
Unlike conventional arbitration awards, which are generally maintained as
confidential,1 85 sanction awards must be published, although the names of the
parties and the attorneys could be expunged. The institutional standards and
procedures for evaluating and sanctioning alleged misconduct could include
the obligation to publish the awards. This requirement would serve a number
of functions.1 86 Foremost, it would aid in the interpretation and refinement of

ethical norms. Codes can only address attorney obligations in the broadest and
most general terms.1 87 As in all systems, the specific content of ethical norms
in international arbitration must be developed through application in specific

cases. 188 Written arbitrator opinions, in the form of sanction awards, would
form a body of nonbinding and persuasive authority to guide future
arbitrations, provide notice to attorneys about how to conduct themselves, and
alert parties to the consequences of breaking particular ethical rules.' 89
On a more practical level, publication is necessary for national courts to

provide an oversight and review function. 190 Although many international
arbitration institutions and some states require arbitral awards with articulated

analyses of decisions, there is in fact some resistance to articulating the
reasoning of the tribunal. 1 91 This situation tempts national courts to second185 Recognizing the benefits of a developed common law of arbitral decisions, UNCITRAL
"is calling for states to designate national correspondents who will send court and arbitral
decisions [interpreting] relevant conventions as well as abstracts of them to the UNCITRAL
Secretariat. The Secretariat will compile the abstracts and enter them into its index or
reference system for the particular convention. The compiled abstracts are to be issued in a
U.N. document (in the six U.N. languages) several times per year."
Peter H. Pfund, United States Participationin TransnationalLawmaking, in LEX MERCATORIA
AND ARBITRATION 203, 212 (Thomas E. Carbonneau ed., 1998).
186 For an expanded discourse on the benefits of published awards in arbitration, see Thomas E.
Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons: The Elaboration of a Common Law of
InternationalTransactions, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 579, 603-610 (1985); REISMAN, supra note
36, at 124.
187 For example, in the context of conflicts of interest, the ambiguous and uncertain language of
ethical rules has been pondered, bemused, expanded, clarified, and refined by courts addressing specific
challenges raised under them. See, e.g., Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest
Doctrine, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 823, 823-24 (1992).
188 In national contexts, rules are supplemented by commentary from bar associations and judicial
opinions that fill out the meaning of often cryptic code language. See Schneyer, supra note 121, at 3940.
189 But see Richard L. Abel, Why Does the ABA PromulgateEthical Rules?, 59 TEX. L. REV. 639,
646(1981).
190 For a description of the role of national courts, see infra Part III.A.2.
191 "The AAA Rules for Commercial Arbitration, reflecting what may be viewed as the traditional
domestic approach, do not require arbitrators to disclose their reasoning and, indeed, the organization in
the past has expressly discouraged the practice as a hedge against judicial review." Richard C. Reuben,
ConstitutionalGravity: A Unitary Theory ofAlternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47
UCLA L. REV. 949, 1083 (2000); see also Julian D.M. Lew, The Casefor the Publication ofArbitration
Awards, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 223 (Jan C. Schultsz & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 1982)
(advocating reasoned substantive arbitral awards and articulating reasons for resistance to articulating
arbitral awards).
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guess the articulated reasoning of substantive awards. 192
While resistance
does not usually take the form of an outright rejection of articulated reasons,
explanations of the tribunal's analysis tend to be more compressed and staccato
than national judicial reasoning, leaving more room for interpretation.193 As
explained in more detail below,194 national courts would have a vital role to
play in reviewing sanction awards. Reasoned and well-articulated awards are
necessary for national courts to accurately perform this review function.
Finally, publication guarantees "some form of continuous public
surveillance." 195 Particularly if the substantive rulemaking for and primary
enforcement of attorney conduct in international arbitration were taken out of
the hands of public bodies, informal public monitoring would become more
important. In the context of professional ethics, as Professor Wilkins has
noted, "[e]nforcement proceedings are an important arena for debating
conflicting visions of the lawyer's role." 196 Even within the international
arbitration community, published sanction awards would generate dialogue
about the appropriate conduct for lawyers that could then guide arbitral
institutions and parties in future efforts to modulate and modify the ethical
rules.
While publication is an essential feature of international arbitration's
ethical regime, a number of issues remain to be resolved. Who would
undertake the task of publishing? Should all sanction awards be published in
their entirety? 197 Would or should published sanction awards have any
influence on future arbitration panels? 198 What effect would publication have
on the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings? These and other likely questions
are potentially difficult to resolve and may in fact be resolved differently by
the various arbitral institutions based on the unique needs of the clients they
serve. Even with these difficulties, however, sanction awards will provide a
vital link between the most competent primary regulator-arbitrators-and
national legal systems, which have some continuing interest in how their
attorneys are behaving and how they are regulated.

192 See Carbonneau, supra note 186, at 602.
193 See Helfer & Dinwoodie, supra note 63, at 198 & n.197.
194 See infra Part II.C
195 REISMAN, supra note 36, at 124 (discussing the desirability of publishing substantive arbitral

awards).
196 Wilkins, Who Should Regulate, supra note 18, at 883; see also Judith Resnik, Due Process:A

PublicDimension, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 405,420 (1987).
197 See Carbonneau, supra note 186, at 600 (posing similar questions with respect to publication of
substantive arbitral awards).
198 Arbitration awards do not purport to have any value as precedent in the sense that they are not
binding on future panels, nor could they be since arbitrators' decisions are not subject to substantive
review. Moreover, in the context of sanction awards, any persuasive authority they may have must be
discounted by the degree of party modification of default ethical norms. This trend may signal a need for
an appellate body for standard international commercial arbitration similar to that available for ICSID
arbitration. For a description of the appellate function in ICSID arbitration, see REISMAN, supra note 14,
at 46-106.
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F. National Legal Systems as Legitimators
Unlike substantive awards on the merits, sanction awards should be subject
to more probing oversight and review by national courts. The justification for
limiting judicial review of substantive awards is that parties in a business
dispute require resolution by a neutral adjudicator and intrusive oversight by
national courts "will transfer real decision power from the arbitral tribunal...
to a national court . . "199 In the context of sanction awards, however, the
inquiry is into an arbitrator's assessment of attorney conduct, not the
arbitrator's assessment of the merits of the case. 200 Consequently, the need to
insulate arbitrator decisionmaking from national court review at the
201
enforcement stage is weaker.
Conversely, in the context of sanction awards, the need for procedural
safeguards is higher. Sanctions for alleged misconduct may affect not only the
pocketbook, but also an attorney's employment and status in the professional
community. National courts are therefore needed as procedural safeguards and
to ensure protection of national interests in the ongoing development and
refinement of ethical rules for international arbitration. 202 Through monitoring
the creation, interpretation, and application of ethical norms, national courts
would also play a vital role in legitimizing arbitral ethical norms 203 and in
providing guidance about the ultimate limits of the power to modify ethical
rules. 204
G. The Role of the New York Convention
Sanction awards would have to be made enforceable under the New York
Convention. However, since the Convention was not written with sanction
awards in mind there are questions about how easily its terms could be
extended to this new type of award. Specifically, there are questions about
199 See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 113.
200 This is not to deny the interrelationship between allegations of misconduct and the merits of the
case. It is easy to imagine that an allegation that one counsel induced a witness to lie would implicate the
factual findings on which the arbitral tribunal rested its award. This potential for abuse does not weigh
against a more active role for national courts. A finding of attorney misconduct of such magnitude would
likely also trigger national court inquiry under Article V of the New York Convention. See, e.g.,
Waterside Ocean Navigation Co. v. Int'l Navigation Ltd., 737 F.2d 150, 153 (2d Cir. 1984) (confirming

award notwithstanding evidence of perjured testimony based on reasoning that falsity of testimony was
raised during proceedings and evaluated by arbitrators).
201 The temptation, of course, will be for reviewing courts to color the analysis of misconduct at
issue in sanction awards with their own culturally determined notions of what is proper for an attorney.
For example, a jurisdiction such as the United States might be reluctant to enforce a sanction award
against a U.S. attorney who sought to prepare a witness for upcoming testimony, even if all participants
to the arbitration had agreed that such practice was impermissible. Similarly, a French court may be
reluctant to enforce sanctions against a French attorney who intentionally withheld documents that would
not be discoverable in a French proceeding. For an explanation of the repulsion of other nations,
including France, to U.S.-style discovery, see BORN & WESTIN, supra note 57, at 849-852.
202 This role raises the possibility of the fragmentation problem, but much less so than if national
institutions were called upon to be primary enforcers. Supra Subpart II.C.2
203 See Carbonneau, supra note 186, at 601.

204 For further discussion about limitations on parties' power to modify ethical norms, see infra
Part lI1.A.2.
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whether two of the jurisdictional requirements that bring an award under the
purview of the New York Convention would be satisfied by sanction awards.
These two jurisdictional requirements are that the dispute arise out of a
commercial relationship, and that it concern a subject matter that is capable of
settlement by arbitration in the country where enforcement is sought.2 05
With regard to the issue of whether sanction awards could be said to arise
out of a commercial relationship, the arguments about interpretation must be
appreciated within the larger framework of those systems that insist on the
commercial relationship prerequisite. As a matter of pure interpretation, it
could be argued that a commercial relationship exists since the underlying
professional relationship between an attorney and client involves a contract for
compensation, even if not traditionally viewed through the lens of commerce.
Moreover, the proposal to make attorneys subject to the new arbitral code of
ethics requires that attorneys agree to be bound by it.206 By so agreeing,
attorneys would undertake an essentially contractual obligation to abide by the
procedural and ethical provisions of the parties' arbitration agreement. In the
same way that claims asserting contractual breaches of the arbitration
agreement could be considered arbitrable and consistent with the New York
Convention's definition of commercial, sanction awards could be treated as
falling within the definition.
Notwithstanding possible arguments in favor of capturing sanction awards
within the definition of commercial, those countries that have opted within
their domestic law for the commercial relationship requirement usually have
rather rigid definitions of what constitutes a commercial relationship. As a
consequence, if those same countries are reluctant to permit arbitrators to
impose sanctions, they could easily accomplish this end by maintaining their
more narrow interpretation of the term "commercial"07 or-under the other
relevant jurisdictional prerequisite-finding that ethical conduct is not
arbitrable. Traditionally, holding that certain subject areas or types of claims
were nonarbitrable was a way for nations to prevent such claims from being
decided by arbitrators. As the range of potential claims that could arise
between private business entities has expanded over the years, so too has
states' willingness to be more flexible in their approach to arbitrability. Since
its accession to the Convention, the United States has increasingly entrusted
regulatory issues to the enforcement of private litigants. 208 While this trend is
only beginning to take hold in Europe, 209 it seems clear that if international
205 See BORN, supra note 63, at 569.
206 See supra Part II.D.
207 For an older example of such reluctance despite the existence of a contract for exchange
between two commercial entities, see India Organic Chems., Ltd. v. Chemtex Fibres Inc., A.I.R. 1978
S.C. 106 (Bombay H.C. 1977), cited in BORN, supra note 63, at 288 n. 189 (concluding that a technology
transfer was not "commercial" under law of India).
208 In fact, even though the Securities Act and the Exchange Act were adopted in the 1930s,
modem enforcement through a private attorney general evolved later. See Mark H. Van De Voorde, The
Fraudon the Market Theory andthe Efficient Markets Hypothesis:Applying a Consistent Standard,14 J.
CORP. L. 443,450-51 (1989).
209 The most immediate examples of this transition in the European Union are the recent reforms to
European antitrust law, which rely more heavily on private attorney general mechanisms for enforcement.
Lucio Lanucara, The Globalization ofAntitrust Enforcement: Governance Issues andLegal Responses, 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 433, 454 n.75 (2002).
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arbitration is to offer full adjudication of claims arising out of a particular
transaction, its reach must permit the arbitration of statutory and tort claims
relating to the underlying commercial claims. Permitting arbitrators to issue
sanction awards must be part of this evolution.
Another issue regarding the application of the New York Convention to
sanction awards is that a heightened standard for review of sanction awards
cuts against existing standards in the New York Convention that permit inquiry
only for excesses of power, abuses of process, and serious infringement on
national policies. Arguably, since the expanded review is incorporated into the
parties' arbitration agreement as part of the arbitral rules, it should be
enforceable under the New York Convention. In other situations when parties
have sought to contractually expand the basis for judicial review of arbitral
awards, some courts have resisted because judicial review of arbitrators'
substantive decisions seems inconsistent with fundamental conceptions of
arbitral jurisdiction and the traditional allocation of power between courts and
arbitrators. 2 10 Expanded review of sanction awards, on the other hand, would
not be inviting courts to second-guess arbitrators' substantive decisions, but
instead allow courts to oversee the development and application of arbitral
ethical rules. Review of sanction awards would invite a more active
partnership with national courts, but in a new area where there are no
preconceived ideas about how limited judicial review should be.
All optimism aside, it may well be that the proposals of this Article would
require amendment to the New York Convention because spontaneous and
consistent national support cannot be presumed in interpretation of the
commercial requirement or in acquiescence to the expanded review of sanction
awards. Instead of representing an unnecessary burden, amendment of the
New York Convention could be a welcome opportunity to update a document
that, while brilliant and in many ways enduring, 211 was drafted in an era in
which significantly different assumptions existed about the nature of business
disputes and the role of arbitration in resolving those disputes. 212
210 See, e.g., Kenneth M. Curtin, Contractual Expansion & Limitation of Judicial Review of
Arbitral Awards, 56 DISP. RESOL. J. 74, 78 (2001) (examining various court decisions permitting

expansion under freedom of contract theory, prohibiting expansion on grounds that it disrupts arbitral
process, and concluding that "parties should be allowed to contractually negotiate as to the scope and
procedure of arbitration, but not as to the substantive enforcement of arbitral agreements or awards").
211 See REISMAN, supra note 14, at 108-09.

212 In addition to the advent of new varieties of business claims based in statute and tort, changes
in the international legal community are challenging certain implicit assumptions upon which the New
York Convention was founded. One particularly interesting example is the absence of an express
provision for refusing enforcement of an award tainted by arbitrator bias or misconduct. Viewed in
historical context, this omission was probably an expression of the existing confidence among the drafters
that arbitrators as well as the parties had an intuitive and reliable sense of honor and duty to conduct
themselves properly. For example, the 1923 version of the ICC Arbitral Rules provided only that parties
were honor-bound to comply with the award. See W. Laurence Craig, Some Trends andDevelopments in
the Laws and Practiceof InternationalCommercialArbitration, TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1995). Thus, the
drafting of the Convention was itself a dramatic shift from the prevailing confidence that there was no
real need for judicial enforcement of arbitral awards because businessmen's sense of honor was sufficient
to ensure voluntary compliance. While drafters of the New York Convention may have been willing to
recognize that losing parties may falter in their commitment to behave honorably, it must have been
unimaginable that one of the "grand old gentlemen" who formed the closed circle of potential arbitrators
(and who were themselves drafting the New York Convention) could stray from their noble duties.
DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 149, at 34-36 (describing the "grand old men" who "played a central
role in the emergence and recognition of arbitration").
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III.

RESPONDING TO POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS TO THE PROPOSED REGIME
TO REGULATE ATTORNEY CONDUCT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

Having proposed an enforcement regime, the task now is to anticipate and
answer some of the inevitable objections. Concerns over the proposals in this
Article will likely arise because they appear to privatize ethical rulemaking and
professional discipline in international arbitration. 2 13
While this
characterization is not entirely accurate, 214 it raises concerns that are bound up
with more profound questions about the nature of ethics, the function of
arbitration, and the legal process more generally. These concerns are likely to
be the forum in which power struggles take place over the control of attorneys
in international arbitration. Not all objections can be answered here, but this
final Part attempts to respond to the most pressing concerns.
A. Assumptions About the State Monopoly on Ethical Rulemaking Power
The concept of ethics is steeped in moral and normative symbolism. It is
this feature that many would claim distinguishes ethical rules from contract
rules. Terms such as price and time of delivery can be altered by the parties,
but ethical rules by their nature are unalterable. 2 15 They protect interests that
are not captured in a contractual agreement and should therefore be treated as
immutable. 216 Under this objection, the need for a match between procedural
arrangements and ethical rules (to the extent such a theory is compatible with
this position) 2 17 is subordinate to the need to maintain the integrity of legal
ethics.
Another, equally forceful critique is that the power to modify would give
the keys to the henhouse to the proverbial fox. 2 18 Although international
lawyers would be entrusted with negotiating changes to default norms, they are
also the ones to be regulated and therefore have an incentive to negotiate out of
any constraints on their conduct. In its most extreme form, this objection
characterizes modifiable ethical norms as a means, if not a direct attempt, to
circumvent and undermine national ethical norms. Both of these objections are
213 See Ware, supra note 64, at 733.
214 As noted above, the international arbitration system is an intricate network of governmental,
intergovernmental, and private institutions operating within the national laws and private and
international agreements that facilitate the practice of international commercial arbitration. See supra
Part II.B.
215 This argument may be asserted with particular vigor when large corporate clients are involved.
See Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1, 23-31 (1988) (arguing in favor
of strong and immutable professional norms as a means of protecting lawyers against the demands of
powerful corporate clients). Although lay classifications tend to frame ethical issues in binary
right/wrong terms, many U.S. ethical rules are not written as immutable. See infra notes 219-221 and
accompanying text.
216 Under contractarian economic theories, immutable rules are distinguishable from default rules
in that immutable rules cannot be changed by contractual agreement. See Richard W. Painter, Advance
Waiver of Conflicts, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 289, 289 (2000).
217 For a description of the relationship between procedural arrangements and ethical norms, see
Rogers, supra note 4, at 412. For an explanation of why this relationship indicates a need for modifiable
norms in arbitration, see supra Part II.B.
218 The fox/henhouse argument has been raised in opposition to self-regulation through
professional bar associations and to judicial participation in the process. See Schneyer, supra note 121, at
41.
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grounded in assumptions about the appropriateness of state monopolies over
rulemaking in the area of ethics. While understandable, they lose their bite
when the context of, and limitations on, the proposed power to modify are
understood.
1. Modifiability in Context
Despite the apparent anomaly of treating ethical rules as contract terms, it
is actually common practice in the United States, 2 19 where many ethical rules
are already contractually modifiable default rules. 220 Model Rule 1.7, for
example, prohibits an attorney from representing a client if the representation
would be "materially limited" by the lawyer's other interests and
responsibilities, but permits the attorney and parties to contract around this
default prohibition. 221 The primary differences between the current U.S.
practice and my proposal are that, under current U.S. practice, only a limited
number of specified rules can be contractually modified in certain predefined
situations, whereas I propose modifiability ex ante and en masse. Under my
proposal, all ethical rules would be subject to contractual modification
(although as explained later not modifiable in their entirety) at the
222
commencement of an arbitration rather than as specific ethical issues arise.
The unique features of the international arbitration system make these
innovations possible as a matter of practice and justifiable as a matter of
policy.
With respect to modifiability en masse, predicate to any consensual
modification of ethical rules is the existence of a contractual relationship
between the attorney and the beneficiary of the attorney's obligations.
Litigation is a compulsory process in which the only formal contractual
relationship that exists is between clients and their attorneys. Consequently, an
attorney and a client can agree to change only those ethical rules designed to
protect the interests of the client; they cannot modify rules designed to protect
the integrity of the proceedings or third parties. 223 In international arbitration,
by contrast, it is possible to expand the realm of ethical norms that are subject
to modification because the realm of formal contractual relationships is
expanded. While the arbitration agreement is the central contract and is often
the only one reduced to writing and typically discussed in the literature, it is
not the only contract. Arbitration establishes a web of contracts between the

219 The European CCBE Code does not appear to permit client waiver of conflicts of interest, but it
has been suggested that such a consent provision is necessary and inevitable. Laurel S. Terry, An
Introduction to the Eurpoean Community s Legal Ethics Code, PartI: An Analysis of the CCBE Code of
Conduct, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 31-32 (1993).
220 See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 7.2.2, at 339-341 (1986).
221 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (1983).
222 Limitations on the parties' ability to contractually modify the proposed ethical codes will be
taken up infra Part III.A.2.
223 See, e.g., Richard W. Painter, Rules Lawyers Play By, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 665, 720 (2001)
(advocating that the optional disclosure rule embraced by the Restatement, and now by the Ethics 2000
Commission, be changed "into a default rule by permitting, and perhaps encouraging, lawyers to contract
around it by opting-up and committing themselves ex ante to disclose client fraud or illegal acts outside
the organization").
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parties, arbitral institutions,

224

arbitrators,2 25 and, under the proposed regime,

the parties' attorneys. When parties pay money to arbitral institutions in
exchange for their services in administering the arbitration, and when parties
pay money (usually indirectly through an intermediary arbitral institution) to
arbitrators in exchange for decisionmaking services, implied-in-fact contracts
arise that supplement the original arbitration agreement between the parties. 226
With all these players implicated in contractual arrangements, it is possible to
expand the range of ethical rules that can be modified through contract to
include those ethical obligations designed to protect interests other than the
client's.
Current U.S. arbitration practice affirms the viability of this proposal. The
U.S. rule pertaining to ex parte communication with party-appointed
arbitrators, while not normally described in such terms, can be understood as
an example of ethical norms modified (or created) for arbitration by
contractual agreement. Ethical rules that normally apply in U.S. litigation
prohibit communication with judges and juries in order to preserve the
impartiality of the decisionmaker. 227 However, judicially ratified U.S.
arbitration rules permit parties to communicate throughout arbitral proceedings
with their party-appointed arbitrators-even about crucial issues involving
strategy. 228 The U.S. arbitration rule permitting ex parte contact can be
224 An excellent description of the contractual arrangement between parties and arbitral institutions
is provided in Fouchard,Gaillard& Goldman on InternationalCommercialArbitration:
By drafting and publishing its arbitration rules, the arbitral institution effectively puts out a
permanent offer to contract, aimed at an indeterminate group of persons .... By concluding
their arbitration agreement, the parties accept that offer and agree to empower their chosen
institution to organize and oversee the arbitration in the event that a dispute arises between
them ... When the request for arbitration is submitted to the institution and it begins to
organize the proceedings, the contract is perfected.
FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 145, 1110.
225 "[A] contract does necessarily exist between the parties and the arbitrators." Id. 1106, at 601.
Parties essentially retain arbitrators to decide their dispute in exchange for a fee, and the contractual
nature of this arrangement is recognized by various jurisdictions. Id. 1105, at 601. "There is also a
contract between the arbitral institution and each of the arbitrators." Id 1111, at 604.
226 Many systems, particularly civil law systems, explicitly acknowledge the contractual nature of
the relationship between arbitrators and parties by imposing liability on arbitrators for professional and
ethical breaches under a contract theory. See Susan D. Franck, The Liability ofInternationalArbitrators:
A ComparativeAnalysis and Proposalfor QualifiedImmunity, 20 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 4
(2000).
227 In the United States, ethical rules impose almost absolute restrictions against ex parte
communications between attorneys and judges, except in certain rare procedural contexts. Exceptions to
the rule against ex parte communications include special proceedings for extraordinary relief (such as
temporary restraining orders), in camera inspections, and similary unusual procedural settings. See
WOLFRAM, supra note 220, § 11.3.3, at 604-05. It is highly unusual for an adjudicating judge to meet
separately with the parties to extract confidential information about the case that might be relied on in
making a decision but need not be disclosed to the opposing party. In a modem trend, many U.S. federal
judges have departed from this strictly disinterested posture and adopted what Judith Resnik terms

"managerial judging." Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 390, 425-27 (1982)
(demonstrating and criticizing this trend).

228 ALAN REDFERN & MARTIN HUNTER, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION 226 (2d ed. 1991) (noting that, "it is not unusual for there to be discussions with just one of
the parties in respect to procedural matters such as availability for future hearings"); AAA/ABA Code of
Ethics for Arbitrators in Commercial Disputes Canons III(B)(I), VII (permitting ex parte
communications with any member of the arbitral tribunal "concerning such matters as setting the time
and place of hearings or making other arrangements for the conduct of the proceedings" and ex parte
communications by party-appointed arbitrators as long as general disclosure is made); see also Sunkist
Soft Drinks, Inc. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 10 F.3d 753, 759 (1993) (holding no misconduct despite
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understood as essentially a creature of contract-it is permissible, even if
inherently incompatible with U.S. ethical rules, 229 because the actors in the
arbitration (most particularly the opposing parties and the arbitrators) have
agreed to it.230 As this example demonstrates, expanding the range of rules
that can be contractually modified is not only a theoretical possibility, but an
existing practice.
With respect to the other major innovation of my proposal-modifiability
ex ante-there are also justifications based on unique features of the
international arbitration system and support in existing precedents. Under the
Model Rules, consensual waivers by clients must be particularized, meaning
that a client can agree to waive specified rights after the facts of the particular
situation are presented. 23 1 Under my proposal, however, clients would already
have undertaken a form of generalized ex ante waiver to the extent that they
agree to be bound by a body of arbitral ethical rules that alters some of the
national ethical rules otherwise governing the attorney-client relationship. 232
This example highlights how client consent to modifications of established
default rules is not substantively different from party consent to ethical rules
specifically designed for international arbitration. The default rules that are
developed and implemented by arbitral institutions will necessarily require that
parties relinquish certain national ethical protections or interests in the same
way that they relinquish certain national procedural rights otherwise
guaranteed in compulsory litigation. 233 For example, U.S. parties who agree to
finding that party-appointed arbitrator met with representatives and witnesses of appointing party before
arbitration to plan strategy).
229 While compatibility with existing rules is an important benchmark, bar associations in the

United States have taken the position that U.S. ethical rules do not apply in international arbitration. See
supra text accompanying note 12.
230 Ex parte communication with party arbitrators makes for an interesting example of an existing
practice of contractually modifying ethical rules, but I am not advocating here that it be adopted as a
substantive rule for international arbitration. While most jurisdictions permit some level of ex parte
communication in judicial proceedings beyond that permissible in U.S. litigation, virtually all national
jurisdictions aside from the United States prohibit contact of the nature permitted between U.S. parties
and their party-appointed arbitrators. See Rogers, supra note 4, at 363. As a consequence, European
parties in international arbitrations may be unaware that U.S. parties are communicating with partyappointed arbitrators. For a description of the problems caused by these differences and a potential
solution, see id.
at 373.

231 For example, with respect to conflicts of interest, Model Rule 1.7 requires that, to be effective,
a waiver of future conflicts "must contemplate that particular conflict with sufficient clarity so [that] the
client's consent can reasonably be viewed as having been fully informed when it was given." ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Profml Responsibility, Formal Op. 93-372 (1993). Recently, the American Bar
Association has undertaken to permit general prospective conflict waivers. These efforts have been
decried by some and applauded by others. Compare Lawrence J. Fox, Alls OK Between Consenting
Adults: EnlightenedRule on Privacy, Obscene Rule on Ethics, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 601, 708-719 (2001)

(describing proposed generalized prospective waivers as a cause for "mischief' and an "unsavory"

request), with Jonathan J. Lerner, Honoring Choice by Consenting Adults: Prospective Conflict Waivers
as a Mature Solution to Ethical Gamesmanship-A Response to Mr.Fox, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 971, 998

(2001) (characterizing the same as "progressive changes").
232 See supra Part lI.B.
233 By agreeing to arbitrate, U.S. parties waive their right to a jury trial and, depending on how the
arbitral procedures are structured, may also waive their rights to extensive discovery, cross-examination
of witnesses, and other procedural guarantees of the U.S. system. See generally Stemlight, supra note 63
(reviewing the various procedural rights that are waived by an agreement to arbitrate). Because
arbitration constitutes a waiver of these rights, in domestic contexts involving parties with unequal
bargaining power there may be much less reason to recommend arbitration. See generally Jean R.

Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury

Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 669 (2001) (arguing that, because arbitration constitutes a waiver
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submit disputes to an arbitration process that is based on hybridized procedural
rules and derivative ethical rules might consent to a more European-style
of
confidentiality rule, which would permit disclosure of categories 234
information that would be considered confidential under U.S. ethical rules.
This consent would be given without the parties knowing precisely which
communications would be subject to disclosure. What the parties would lose
in protection of certain categories of confidential information would be gained
in the coherence and overall fairness of proceedings in which all the parties are
operating under the same definition of confidentiality.
The difference between party consent to individual modifications and party
consent to an entire prefabricated ethical code is that the latter would have
been carefully constructed and calibrated by the arbitral institution and would
necessarily be the product of deliberative analysis. In the former situation,
however, it is possible that rash or unwise decisions could be made if the
decision was abstracted from specific situations in which the parties might
better appreciate what interests and rights they were waiving. Indeed, this is
precisely the concern underlying those Model Rules that require actual
informed consent, such as Model Rules 1.7 and 1.2(c). Such rules serve an
important function in standard litigation contexts by protecting clients who are
vulnerable and relatively uninformed of their legal rights.2 35 In international
arbitration, however, where parties are by definition sophisticated, wellfunded, and well-represented, 36 the need to protect clients is lessened and is
outweighed by the need to ensure coherence and proper functioning of the
system. These are precisely the arguments that are mustered in favor of
decisions,
permitting ex ante waiver of client prerogatives over settlement
2 37
particularly when insurance carriers pay for representation.
While agreement of the interested actors would be a necessary requirement
for modification of default ethical rules, it would not always be a sufficient
one. Ethical rules are also needed to protect both the interests of the
international arbitration system and various national interests that may be
implicated in particular disputes, but which are not represented in the
contractual arrangements that constitute a particular arbitration. By way of
example, it is possible that a modified ethical rule, even if contractually agreed
of the constitutional right to a jury trial, courts should not be so willing to enforce arbitration agreements
in consumer, employment, and medical services agreements).
234 As I have explained elsewhere, legal systems take rather different views about the extent of an
attorney's confidentiality obligations. In civil law countries (except France), the concept of "professional
secrets" protects only information communicated by a client to an attorney. Information communicated
to clients or obtained through communications with other attorneys is not included as information that
attorneys are obligated to maintain as secret. In common law systems, the notion of confidentiality,
which is closely tied to the attorney-client privilege, is much broader and incorporates both
communications from an attorney to a client and from a client to an attorney. Under Islamic law, the
principles of shari'a arguably impose an even higher duty of confidentiality, requiring protection not only
of communications between attorneys and clients, but also protection of all information relating to
representation. Rogers, supra note 4, at 371.
235 Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentals of Law4yers' Ethics to Insurance Defense
Practice,4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 46 (1997).
236 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text. Asymmetry between parties is usually raised in

opposition to ex ante contracting around legal protection. Cf Painter, supra note 2165, at 290-91 (noting
that ex ante waiver of fiduciary duties is sometimes permitted in corporate law, but such waiver is limited
based on informational asymmetry between managers and shareholders).
237 See Kent Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REv. 1113, 1163-1185 (1990).
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to, may do such violence to a fundamental principle of fairness that an award
rendered in accordance with it is inherently unfair. 238 Such a rule might, for
example, permit the parties to offer financial incentives to the arbitrators in
exchange for particular decisional outcomes or free them of any obligation not
to misrepresent facts to the tribunal. 239 An award rendered through
proceedings premised on such a rule would degrade the international
arbitration system, even if the parties in an individual arbitration were willing
to accept the result. 240 These concerns, which I will refer to as residual
interests, are not enough to preclude the possibility of modifiable ethical
norms, but they are sufficient to raise concerns about the limitations that would
exist on the power to modify.
2. Constraintson the Powerto Modify
Attorney power to modify the arbitral codes would be limited by a range of
interdependent constraints.
Before considering the constraints that are
integrated into the international arbitration system, it should be noted that
several external constraining forces also exist.24 1 For example, many national
statutes criminalize 242 and impose civil liability243 for conduct that also
constitutes an ethical violation. National statutes will continue to prohibit such
conduct, even if the correspondent ethical rule was modified. 244 In addition to
238 For an examination of the principle of fairness and its central importance to legal ethics and
adjudication generally, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 362-64.
239 It is unlikely that parties would actually craft rules affirmatively permitting such conduct, but it
is possible that they might agree to a standard that, for example, so dilutes obligations on counsel
regarding representations to the tribunal that it permits what would be considered direct
misrepresentations. Cf Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927) (concluding that an arrangement

compensating a judge based on number of convictions gave the judge a "direct, personal, substantial,
pecuniary interest" in the outcome of the case and was therefore unconstitutional).
240 Some argue that permitting ex parte communication with party arbitrators is just such a rule.
See, e.g., Desiree A. Kennedy, Predisposedwith Integrity: The Elusive Quest for Justice in Tripartite

Arbitrations, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 749, 764 (1995) (criticizing arbitration that permits party
communication with arbitrators as incompatible with the objective of impartial adjudication).
241 Notably, conduct that is not addressed in a code of arbitral ethics, such as attorney handling of
client funds or attorney advertising, will remain subject to national ethical rules or any international rules
that may eventually be developed. Rogers, supra note 4, at 379-394, 406 (explaining that ethical rules
for arbitration need only address those obligations that directly pertain to advocacy activities).
242 For example, some types of conflicts of interest may constitute a criminal offence. See, e.g.,
United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 922 (2d Cir. 1981) (affirming conviction of lawyer for
fraudulent use of mails for a conflicting and undisclosed purpose), cited in WOLFRAM, supra note 220, §
7.1.1, at 314 & n.6. Moreover, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can be
applied if a lawyer assists a client in committing crimes. See id. at 698.
243 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6068(e) (West 1990) ("It is the duty of the attorney to...
maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself or herself to preserve the secrets, of his or
her client."). These constraints are not sufficient to obviate the need for the articulated and binding norms
proposed in this Article, but they do provide substantial safeguards against attorney efforts to abolish
ethical constraints altogether. Malpractice claims are the other obvious area of civil liability. In that
context, ethical codes are standards used to evaluate whether client ratification should be treated as an
affirmative defense to legal malpractice claims and more generally as a source of guidance in evaluating
civil liability. WOLFRAM, supra note 220, at 206-226, 252.
244 Although most bar associations have not sought to have their rules applied in international
arbitration, it is possible that such rules could be used as a secondary means of enforcement, for example
in those states that permit private rights of action for violations of ethical rules. See supra note 12. The
U.S. Model Rules prohibit attorneys from making any material misrepresentations of fact or law to third
parties, which could arguably include the arbitral tribunal. Since, at least in the United States, attorneys
do not enjoy the same immunity in arbitration that they do in litigation settings, it is possible that a
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formal prohibitions, informal constraints such as professional reputation and
peer pressure would deter overzealous truncating of ethical obligations. 245
Even attorneys who might be willing to act unscrupulously are likely to
hesitate before alerting their opponent to their indifference toward ethical rules,
particularly in the delicate moments of precontractual and predispute
negotiations.
Turning to the international arbitration system and the proposed regime,
there are a range of constraints on the power to modify, which together provide
protection for clients, opposing parties, and third parties. Clients are protected
against injurious modifications because the power to modify ultimately rests in
their hands. No alterations can be made without their consent, and, in the
context of international commercial arbitration, that consent typically comes
from a sophisticated international company. 246 Opposing parties are similarly
protected by a consent requirement. Any incentive a party may have to
minimize the ethical constraints on its own attorney will be counterbalanced by
the party's disincentive to bargain away constraints on opposing counsel. 247
Consequently, the opposing party, the most likely victim of attorney
misconduct in an advocacy setting, also enjoys some level of protection
inherent in the modification process.
Even in light of these constraining forces, it is still possible that attorneys
could exceed the limits of good sense and seek to eliminate essential ethical
precepts from the rules that bind them. This is where systemic controls would
come into play. Parties and counsel who tamper with fundamental essentials of
legal ethics risk that an award produced under their modifications will not be
enforceable. Under the New York Convention, national courts can refuse to
enforce arbitral awards if basic notions of fairness and justice were not
observed during the arbitral proceedings, 248 as would be the case if
fundamental ethical precepts were abrogated. 249 Parties could not, for
example, expect that an award would be enforceable if they had erased all
prohibitions against misrepresenting facts to the tribunal or against bribing
arbitrators.
This threat of unenforceability will likely deter abusive
modifications.
In addition to the specified grounds in Article V(a) of the New York
Convention, national courts are also able to protect those aspects of ethics that
are of particular importance to their national regulatory scheme. Article V(b)
of the Convention contains a public policy exception that permits national
misrepresentation to an arbitral tribunal could give rise to a claim for fraud. While interesting to
contemplate, particularly since the res judicata effect of arbitral awards is dubious, such collateral claims
could do serious damage to the arbitration system if they became a popular replacement for appeal. This
example, and others like it, raises what Wilkins refers to as problems of duplication and conflicts. See
Wilkins, How Should We Determine,supra note 21, at 487-89.
245 Cf Reisman, Looking, Staring,supra note 121, at 172-76 (describing the role of social pressure
and informal regimes in regulating behavior).
246 See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
247 Cf McConnaughay, supra note 2, at 490 (arguing that notwithstanding contrary predictions,
"private contractual choice of law traditionally has not had the effect of displacing otherwise applicable
mandatory law").
248 See Park, supra note 62, at 701.
249 For a discussion of uncompromisable, universally accepted ethical precepts, see Rogers, supra

note 4, at 358.
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courts to refuse enforcement of awards that offend their domestic public policy.

This public policy exception has been defined very narrowly by courts and has
rarely been successfully invoked.2 50 The narrowness of this review does not
open an unduly broad chasm to avoid the finality of arbitral awards, but still
ensures that states can insist on ethical protections that they consider
fundamental, mandatory, and inalienable.
Model Rule 1.7 provides one potential example illustrating how nations
might draw the dividing line between permissible and impermissible
modifications.
Under this rule, a party cannot consent to conflicting
representation unless the lawyer reasonably believes that the party's
representation will not be adversely affected. 25 1 This limitation has been
interpreted to require an objective evaluation of whether there is a threat to the
client's representation 2 that is not universally considered necessary to ensure
the fundamental fairness of proceedings.
Under prevailing European
standards, for example, it appears that subjective belief by the attorney is
sufficient to avoid a conflict of interest. 253 If U.S. courts reviewing substantive
awards were to decide that the objective standard was immutable, as suggested
by the structure of the rule, they might refuse to enforce an award under the
public policy exception when an attorney represented a client notwithstanding
an objectively objectionable conflict of interest. In this way, the public policy
exception could act as an escape hatch that permits national courts to police
modification in order to ensure that they do not violate essential assumptions
about attorney conduct.
While accommodating national policy interests, using the public policy
exception as a tool for examining the external limits on modifiability also has
potential perils. It is possible that national courts could, under the guise of
policing these outer limits, seek to imprint their own "substantive tilt" or
2 54
interpretation, thus resurrecting the fragmentation problem discussed earlier.
However, given the historically overwhelming restraint with which national
courts have applied the public policy exception55 and the asserted disavowal
of national ethical regulation in this context, such national opportunism seems
250 See Carbonneau, supra note 42, at 32 (noting that the French Cour de cassation "has devised a
special notion of ordre public for international [arbitral awards] ... [P]ublic policy is confined to due
process considerations and requirements of basic procedural fairness").
251 Model Rule 1.7(b)(2) states that the "consultation" with clients regarding conflicting
representation "shall include explanation of the implications of the common representation and the
advantages and risks involved." MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b)(2) (1999). These
requirements will ordinarily be met in the course of negotiating modifications to default rules and
memorializing the agreed-upon modifications. See WOLFRAM, supra note 220, § 7.2.4, at 343-48
(describing consultation and consent principles under the Model Rules).
252 See id. § 7.2.3, at 341.
253 It has yet to be determined how the standard for conflicts of interest under the CCBE Code will
be interpreted. It is likely, however, that given how conflicts of interest were until recently left to the
subjective decision of the attorney, European sensibilities will be satisfied with a less restrictive standard
(e.g., as long as the attorney subjectively believes that representation will not be impaired). See Daly,
supra note 11, at 1150 (noting that in some countries, professional ethics are handed down as oral
tradition and only address the most obvious conflicts of interest, leaving the rest to personal
relationships).
254 See supra text accompanying note 158.
255 COMM.

ON INT'L COM. ARB.,

INTERIM REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY AS A BAR TO

ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL AWARDS 35 (2000), http://www.ila-hq.org/pdf/Int%20
Conmercial%20Arbitration/ComArbitration.pdf (noting that such claims are rarely successful).
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unlikely. Instead, it is quite possible that national court review will stimulate a
healthy and productive cross-cultural dialogue about national ethical regimes,
which could prove useful when the international community turns, as it will
inevitably,2 56 to the task of drafting generally applicable supranational ethical
rules. 257

While national courts would be the ultimate bastions of protection against
abusive modification, arbitrators would also exercise a control function.
Because arbitrators are always (or should always be) concerned with the
effectiveness of their awards, 258 they could use their powers to ensure that
ethical modifications do not imperil enforcement. Arbitrators generally have a
great deal of discretion in managing proceedings, but this power usually yields
if both parties have agreed to a particular set of procedural and ethical rules. It
is unclear to what extent arbitrators have the power or obligation to disregard
the will of the parties in order to ensure the fairness of the arbitral
proceedings.2 59
Even when the parties have agreed to a rule, arbitrators would still have the
Faced with a general rule that appeared to
power of interpretation.
critical
ethical precepts, arbitrators could interpret and
undermine
unacceptably
apply the rule in a way that ensures the fundamental fairness of the
proceedings. 260 To the extent that modifications take place after proceedings
256 Hans Smit, The Future of International Commercial Arbitration: A Single Transnational
Institution?, 25 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 9, 22 (1986); see Majumdar, supra note 108, at 453; Jarvis,
supra note 108, at 59. See generally John Toulmin, A Worldwide Common Code ofProfessionalEthics?,
15 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 673 (1991-1992) (discussing the CCBE's adoption of the Code of Conduct for
Lawyers in the European Community and the need for an international common code of ethics).
257 Cf Lowenfeld, supra note 135, at 654-55 (arguing that lessons learned in international
arbitration can aid in refining national and international adjudicatory techniques and procedures).
258 Park, supra note 62, at 655-56; see Yves Derains, Public Policy and the Law Applicable to
the Dispute in International Arbitration, in COMPARATIvE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 227, 245-47 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (suggesting that arbitrators must
keep an eye toward the mandatory law of the likely enforcement jurisdiction or jurisdictions to ensure
that their award is enforceable). Article 26 of the ICC Rules expressly states that arbitrators "shall
make every effort to make sure that the award is enforceable at law." CRAIG ET AL., supra note 62,
app. 2, at 10. Moreover, in ICC arbitration, the International Court of Arbitration (the administrative
body of the ICC), is empowered under Article 21 to scrutinize awards and "draw attention" to points
of substance that might interfere with enforcement of the award. Stephen Bond, Recent Developments
in InternationalChamber of Commerce (1CC) Arbitration, 477 PLI/Comm. 55, 78-79 (1988).
259 The English 1996 Act provides a helpful example of this problem. The Act imposes on
arbitrators a duty to "act fairly and impartially" and permit each party "a reasonable opportunity" both to
put on its case and to respond to its opponent's case. Martin Hunter, The Procedural Powers of
Arbitrators Under the English 1996 Act, 13 ARB. INT'L 345, 346 (1997) (citing section 33(1) of the Act).
In addition, the Act imposes a duty on arbitrators to adopt procedures and exercise their powers generally
in a way that "provide[s] a fair means for the resolution of the matter[]" Id. These obligations appear to
be in conflict with the requirement in section 34, which states that the power of the tribunal to decide
procedural and evidentiary matters is "subject to the right of the parties to agree [sic] any matter." Id.
Some scholars suggest that this apparent tension does not create an opportunity for arbitrators to
disregard the will of the parties and is instead resolved by the ability of arbitrators to resign if an
agreement of the parties conflicts with their obligations under section 33. Id. at 347.
260 In doing so, arbitrators would not be disregarding the parties' intentions so much as interpreting
those intentions at a higher level of abstraction. Premier among the parties' intentions in selecting
arbitration is to arrive at an effective means for resolving their dispute-choosing a means that will
produce an enforceable award. This approach is not without its problems. At a theoretical level it may be
seen as derogating party consent, while at a practical level it may not be likely, at least according to those
who point to pressures on arbitrators to capitulate to parties' most immediate desires. See Andrew T.
Guzman, ArbitratorLiability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 1279, 1282
(2000) (arguing that arbitrators are unlikely to enforce mandatory rules when the parties seek to contract

around them).
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have begun, arbitrators would be able to use their powers of persuasion to urge
reason upon ethically reckless parties.
In sum, as I have argued elsewhere, ethical rules can only effectively
regulate attorneys if they coincide with the functional roles assigned to
attorneys through the chosen procedures in particular arbitrations. 26 1 Because
procedural rules in international arbitration are subject to modification, the
attendant ethical rules must also, with some limitations, be modifiable. The
potential for abuse of this power to modify will be deterred and controlled by
multiple and interrelated constraints.
B. Challengingthe Distinctionbetween Public and PrivateFunctions
Currently, none of the major arbitral rules expressly confer on arbitrators
the power to sanction for misconduct. 262 Analogs in the public international
law arena do not offer much guidance because international tribunals have only
rarely addressed the issue of their own power to sanction attorney
misconduct. 263 Perhaps as a consequence of this silence, 264 scholars have paid
little attention to the issue of whether arbitrators have such power.265 A review
of scholarship in this area reveals only a few stray conclusory remarks, with
261 For an analysis of the relationship between the content of ethical rules and the procedural rules
that shape and define the functional role of the lawyer in an advocacy setting, see Rogers, supra note 4,
at 380-395.
262 The only partial exception appears to be the recently promulgated arbitral rules developed by
the Center for Public Resources ("CPR"). Designed to provide an alternative to the popular UNCITRAL
rules for ad hoc arbitration, an arbitrator is authorized under the CPR rules to "impose any remedy it
deems just, including an award on default, wherever a party materially fails to comply with the rules."
Robert H. Smit & Nicholas J. Shaw, The Center for Public Resources Rules for Non-Administered
Arbitration of InternationalDisputes: A Criticaland Comparative Commentary, 8 AM. REV. INT'L ARB.
275, 310 (1997). Notably, the power contemplated by the CPR rules seems to extend only to the parties
and not to their attorneys. Cf id. (discussing the application of the CPR rules to parties and not to
attorneys).
263 The sanctioning power of international tribunals has only recently been raised in the Appeals
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). See Prosecutor v.
Dugko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Appeals Chamber,
Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin (Jan. 31, 2000),
http://www.un.org.icty/tadic/appeal/judgement/vuj-aj00013 le.htm (finding counsel in contempt for
inducing perjury by witnesses). Interestingly, the ICTY is one of the only international bodies to draft
and implement a code of ethics. See, e.g,. ICTY Code of Professional Conduct for Defence Counsel
(IT/125), http://www.un.org/icty/basic/counsel/IT125.htm. The ICJ has only criticized counsel on two
occasions and has apparently never attempted to impose any sort of sanction on counsel. See Vagts,
supra note 5, at 260.
264 Another likely source of this omission is the fact that courts are often understood to have
certain inherent powers, which are only reluctantly attributed to international tribunals. Compare
Wolfram, supra note 27, at 3-6 (discussing the history of the inherent sanctioning power of courts to
regulate lawyers), with Michael Bohlander, International Criminal Defense Ethics: The Law of
Professional Conductfor Defense Counsel Appearing Before InternationalCriminal Tribunals, I SAN
DIEGO INT'L L.J. 75, 82-90 (2000) (discussing the statutory basis for the International Criminal
Tribunal's sanction powers for conduct that interferes with the administration ofjustice). This dissidence
is most likely a product of the fact that the concept of "inherent powers" is linked to traditional notions
of sovereignty. See, e.g., Andrew W. Hayes, Note, The Boland Amendments and Foreign Affairs
Deference, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1544 (1988) (using the term "inherent power" to refer to plenary
powers derived from the nature of sovereignty and the exigencies of conducting national policy
independent of the constitutional text).
265 The lack of attention paid to the power of arbitrators to sanction is inevitably related to the
larger reasons that little attention has been paid to the lack of ethical regulation in international
arbitration. This neglect is likely attributable to the fact that until recently the conduct in arbitration was
informally regulated by social controls. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
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little or no explanation or analysis of the origin of such power.266 Almost no
authoritative scholarly work has been done to explore whether international
arbitrators have the power to sanction parties and their counsel for
267
misconduct.
There is no clear guidance from national precedents to fill this void. The
few national courts that have addressed the subject have reached discordant
conclusions. Only three jurisdictions in the United States have considered
whether arbitrators have the power to sanction. Of those, courts in the District
of Columbia and Rhode Island decided that arbitrators do have an inherent
power to sanction,2 68 while New York courts adamantly refused to ratify any
such power.269 Meanwhile-notwithstanding traditional hostility toward
266 Compare Thomas E. Carbonneau, National Law and the Judicialization of Arbitration:
Manifest Destiny Manifest Disregard, or Manifest Error, in INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION INTHE 21 ST
CENTURY: TOWARDS "JUDICIALIZATION" AND UNIFORMITY? 115, 129 (Richard B. Lillich & Charles N.
Brower eds., 1993) (suggesting that arbitrators possess "authority to sanction a party for refusing to
cooperate in good faith with the arbitral proceeding"), with CRAIG ET AL., supra note 62, § 8.07, at 145
(stating bluntly that arbitrators do not have the power to hold parties in contempt). Some commentators
have engaged in more reasoned consideration of the issue, but even their conclusions are tentative and
incomplete. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 35, at 576 (concluding, based on the New York Code of
Professional Responsibility, that in the context of attorney disqualification, "it is clear that arbitrators are
empowered, directly and indirectly, to regulate the conduct of lawyers"); C. Thomas Mason III, Lawyers'
Duties of Candor Toward the Arbitral Tribunal, 998 PL/Corp. 59, 64 (1997) ("There are sanctions and
remedies available to arbitrators who conclude that counsel has misrepresented the law or, through lack
of due candor, has jeopardized the fairness of the proceedings."); Vagts, supra note 5, at 255 (noting that
although arbitral "U]urisdiction over cases charging attorney misconduct in arbitration is in doubt... [i]t
appears that while arbitrators have no authority to suspend or disbar attorneys, they could disqualify
attorneys from appearing before them and could impose sanctions for attorney misbehavior when it came
to assessing the costs of the arbitration").
267 Darren C. Blum's Punitive Power: Securities Arbitrators Need It is apparently the only article
that squarely addresses a potential sanction power for arbitrators in the context of U.S. domestic
securities arbitration. Darren C. Blum, Punitive Power: Securities ArbitratorsNeed It, 19 NOVA L. REV.
1063 (1995).
268 An appellate court in the District of Columbia held that arbitrators have authority to impose
sanctions, including costs and fees, for misconduct such as discovery abuses. Pisciotta v. Shearson
Lehman Bros., Inc., 629 A.2d 520, 525-26 (D.C. 1993). Following the District of Columbia's lead and
arguing by analogy to statutory judicial powers, a Rhode Island court found that arbitrators possess the
power to award attorneys' fees for discovery misconduct. Terrace Group v. Vermont Castings, Inc., 753
A.2d 350, 354 (R.I. 2000). This decision may have more limited application because it was based on a
Vermont statute that expressly permits an award of attorneys' fees for bad faith conduct.
269 Only two New York courts have decided the issue of arbitrator power to rule on ethical
misconduct. See Bidermann Indus. Licensing, Inc. v. Avmar N.V., 173 A.D.2d 401, 402 (N.Y. App. Div.
1991) (finding that issue of attorney disqualification involves interpretation and application of attorney
ethical codes as well as a client's right to counsel, and therefore cannot be left to the determination of
arbitrators); see also In re Erdheim and Selkowe, 51 A.D.2d 705, 705 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976) ("[W]e find
nothing in the record before us authorizing or empowering this privately chosen arbitration board to
censure members of the Academy; and the power to censure attorneys as members of the Bar is reserved
to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in each department."). Other New York cases have
considered related matters, such as the proper forum for motions for disqualification from an arbitration,
and whether attorney disqualification is a matter that a generally worded arbitration agreement can be
interpreted as submitting to the arbitral tribunal. See In re Erlanger and Erlanger, 20 N.Y.2d 778, 779
(App. Div. 1967) (holding that "jurisdiction to discipline an attorney for misconduct is vested exclusively
in the Appellate Division" and that motions for disqualification are matters to be resolved by the court in
which the matter is pending, as opposed to another court); see also In re Arbitration between R3
Aerospace, Inc. and Marshall of Cambridge Aerospace Ltd., 927 F. Supp. 121, 125 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that the issue of attorney disqualification from representation in arbitral proceedings is not
arbitrable and does not relate to an arbitration agreement due to the lack of federal jurisdiction under the
New York Convention for disputes concerning disqualification of counsel in arbitration). A claim for
disqualification of counsel, while bound up in ethical issues, is procedurally distinct from sanctions. As
such, many argue that such claims should be based on a different substantive standard. See, e.g., Thomas,
supra note 35, at 563 (arguing that disqualification is not a remedy aimed at punishing misconduct, but
rather a pragmatic effort to protect the integrity of ongoing proceedings).
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public functions in arbitration-a French court has held that arbitrators, in their
role as private judges, have the responsibility of assuring party compliance
with the rules of international public policy. 270 This power arguably would
include at least the fundamentals of legal ethics, which ensure basic procedural
fairness. While providing interesting background, these scant precedents do

little to resolve the issue.
27 1
Arbitrators do generally have the power to formulate procedural rules,
272
which might be presumed to include the power to enforce those rules.
Although more controversial, it has also been suggested that in formulating
damage awards, arbitral tribunals can take into account the failure of a party to
carry out an interim order.2 73 Another analogous power is arbitrators' ability to
issue a default award when a party or its counsel refuses to submit to arbitral
jurisdiction or to participate in arbitration.2 74 A default award is a means for
proceeding in the absence of a party, but can also be viewed as a sanction for
refusing to participate in an adjudication.2 75 When arbitral rules become
incorporated by reference into the parties' agreement, parties are contractually
obligated to abide by the arbitral rules. 276 Failure to abide by arbitral rules,
like failure to abide by any other contractual obligation, could give rise to a
claim for damages, though parties rarely assert such claims. 277 On the other
270 Societd Ganz v. Societ6 Nationale des Chemin de Fers Tunisiens, Revue de L'arbitral 478 CA
Paris (1991), cited in Thomas E. Carbonneau & Francois Janson, CartesianLogic and FrontierPolitics:
French andAmerican Concepts ofArbitrability, 2 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 193, 218 & n.125 (1994).
271 Fritz Nicklisch, Agreement to Arbitrate to Fill Contractual Gaps, 5 J. INT'L ARB. 35, 36
(1988); see Smit, supra note 256, at 23-24.
272 The Paris Court of Appeal has ruled that arbitrators have not only the authority but also the
jurisdictional right to apply the rules of international public policy. Societ Ganz, 478 CA Paris at 480. A
few U.S. courts have reached similar results, again with little explanation. See Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v.
Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1023 n.8 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Arbitrators may... devise appropriate
sanctions for abuse of the arbitration process."); Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 240, 246 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) ("[A]rbitrators ... may be able to devise sanctions if they find that [a
party] has impeded or complicated their task by refusing to cooperate in pretrial disclosure of relevant
matters."). Similarly, the ICTY has assumed, since its inception, the power to sanction attorneys for
misconduct:
A power in the Tribunal to punish conduct which tends to obstruct, prejudice or abuse its
administration of justice is a necessity in order to ensure that its exercise of the jurisdiction
which is expressly given to it by its Statute is not frustrated and that its basic judicial functions
are safeguarded. Thus the power to deal with contempt is clearly within its inherent
jurisdiction. That is not to say that the Tribunal's powers to deal with contempt or conduct
interfering with the administration ofjustice are in every situation the same as those possessed
by domestic courts, because its jurisdiction as an international court must take into account its
different setting within the basic structure of the international community.
Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A-R77, Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo., Appeals
Chamber, Judgment on Allegations of Contempt against Prior Counsel, Milan Vujin, at 60 (Jan. 31,
2000), http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/vujin-e/vuj-ajOO 0131 e.pdf.
273 Homing, supra note 163, at 155 (citing Seventh SecretariatNote, A/CN.9/264, on Article 18.5
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, in HOWARD M. HOTZMANN & JOSEPH E. NEUHAUS, A GUIDE TO THE
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 543 (1989)).
274 FOUCHARD, GAILLARD & GOLDMAN, supra note 145, 1224.
275 See Bitzko v. Gamache, 564 N.Y.S.2d 808, 808 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
276 See Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration, 63 TUL. L. REV. 629, 644 (1989) (stating that
arbitration agreements should be enforced when they are valid and effective under applicable law).
277 In my practical experience, the only such claims I saw were allegations that a party had failed
to engage in good faith negotiations, as required by the agreement as a predicate to commencing
arbitration. Since it is nearly impossible to assess whether a party engaged in settlement negotiations in
"good faith," such allegations were used more as an attempt to disparage the opponent than as an
assertion of a substantive claim. The most likely reason why there are no reported cases alleging breach
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hand, these powers have not traditionally been sufficient to overcome the
reluctance, particularly in civil law countries, to empower arbitrators to
perform traditionally public or punitive functions.2 78
Objections raised against arbitrators exercising public functions, such as
using sanction power, boil down to essentially three types of concerns. The
first area of concern is about substantive results-that arbitrators often
intentionally do not apply the law or are not as competent as judges at applying
complex national laws and, as a consequence, will get it wrong. 279 The second
area of concern is procedural-that the public interests involved require the
procedural protections and judicial oversight that are lacking in arbitration. 80
The final area of objection is more symbolic-that punishment and
enforcement of mandatory law involve traditional notions of the government's
function and should therefore be reserved solely for government officials.281
Of these three areas of concern, the first two are ameliorated if not completely
redressed by the proposed regime, while the third requires investigation of
what is really at stake.
1. Arbitrator Competence

Arbitrator competence may be subject to question when arbitrators are
asked to apply complex law with which they are unfamiliar, such as complex
national statutory law. 282 This concern does not, however, translate into the

context of an arbitrator sanction power in international arbitration. Arbitrators
would be applying ethical rules developed especially for international
commercial arbitration and tailored specifically to the procedures used in their
particular arbitration. 28 3 The conduct at issue would, by definition, have
occurred during the arbitral proceedings. Consequently, as explained in more
detail above, 284 arbitrators are uniquely qualified to interpret arbitral ethical
of an arbitration agreement is that default awards and awards of costs and fees usually satisfy harm done
by recalcitrant parties. It is worth noting that, because claims alleging misconduct by an attorney would
arise out of the arbitration agreement, under most arbitration clauses arbitrators would have jurisdiction to
adjudicate those claims.
278 For a discussion of reluctance among different systems to empower arbitrators to award
punitive damages and perform other public functions, see supra notes 73-91 and accompanying text.
279 See Ware, supra note 64, at 735.
280 Ira P. Rothken, Punitive Damages in Commercial Arbitration: A Due Process Analysis, 21
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 387, 404 (1991) (opposing punitive awards in arbitration because arbitrators

are not restrained by the rigor of due process); see also Kenneth R. Davis, Due Process Right to Judicial
Review of Arbitral Punitive Damages, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 583, 585 (1995) (arguing that the Supreme
Court's decision in Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, which held that due process requires appellate review of
jury awards of punitive damages, also extends to arbitration). But see Stephen J. Ware, Punitive
Damages in Arbitration:Contracting Out of Governments Role in Punishment and FederalPreemption
of State Law, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 529, 559 & n.129 (1994) (arguing that under the present state actor

doctrine, constitutional protections are not implicated by commercial arbitration).
281 See supra Subpart I.B.5.

282 Marc Blessing, Mandatory Rules of Law versus Party Autonomy in InternationalArbitration,
14 J. INT'L ARB. 23, 28 (1997); Edward Chukwuemeke Okeke, Judicial Review of Foreign Arbitral
Awards: Bane, Boon or Boondoggle?, 10 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 29, 31-32 (1997); Pierre Mayer, Mandatory
Rules of Law in InternationalArbitration,2 ARB. INT'L 274, 275 (1986); McConnaughay, supra note 2,

at 494-95. Indeed, anxiety over arbitrators applying mandatory law has become something of a mania,
oflen producing extreme proposals. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 70, at 1316 (advocating the imposition
of personal liability on arbitrators to deter them from avoiding application of mandatory rules).
283 See Rogers, supra note 4, at 379-387.
284 See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
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rules and uniquely positioned to evaluate whether attorney conduct comports
with those rules.
2. ProceduralProtections
The second area of concern, lack of procedural safeguards, is also
redressed in this proposed regime, which contemplates publication and
enhanced judicial review of sanction awards. It is not clear whether, as a
matter of U.S. constitutional law, heightened judicial review of sanction
awards is necessary because of their punitive nature. There has been extensive
scholarly debate about whether arbitration involves state action and thereby
implicates constitutional protections such as due process. It is not necessary
in this Article to weigh in on that debate because, even if constitutional due
process concerns do not require increased procedural protections when
arbitration is punitive, prudential concerns do.285 The procedural protections
of my proposal are sufficient to satisfy both prudential concerns and any
constitutional due process requirements implicated from sanction awards. 286
As proposed above, 287 heightened review of reasoned sanction awards
would be formulated as something more penetrating than the current factors in
Article V of the New York Convention, but something less exacting than de
novo review. This deferential but substantive review would allow courts to
ensure that arbitral interpretations of ethical rules are reasonable and that there
is some support for the factual findings.
In much the same manner, the U.S. Supreme Court has suggested, although
not particularly clearly, that reluctance about submitting such claims to
arbitrators is alleviated if national courts take a "second look" at arbitral
awards involving mandatory law claims. 2 88 Although the meaning and
application of the second look doctrine remain unclear, at a minimum the
285 Even if under constitutional doctrine the Due Process clause is formally implicated, the
question then becomes: How much process is due? When parties waive their right to a jury trial, they
cannot then appeal a judicial verdict on the ground that it was not rendered by a jury. Similarly, it seems

that when parties agree to waive their right to go to court and opt instead to be bound by an arbitration
clause, they cannot argue that they were unfairly denied all the rigors of traditional adjudication.
286 In Merriman v. Security Ins. Co., the Fifth Circuit summed up the current approach to attorney
discipline under Rule 11, stating:
In the Rule 11 context, due process demands only that the sanctioned party be afforded notice
and an opportunity to be heard. What constitutes sufficient process depends on the
circumstances of each case ... [D]ue process does not demand an actual hearing. In Rule 11
cases, the opportunity to respond through written submissions usually constitutes sufficient
opportunity to be heard.
Merriman v. Security Ins. Co., 100 F.3d 1187, 1191-92 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted).
287 See supra Parts II.D & I.G
288 This doctrine derives from the Court's now famous dicta in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), where the Court stated that in arbitrations implicating U.S.
antitrust claims:
[t]he tribunal... should be bound to decide that dispute in accord with the national law giving
rise to the claim ... [I]n the event the choice-of-forum and choice-of-law clauses operated in
tandem as a prospective waiver of a party's right to pursue statutory remedies for antitrust
violations, we would have little hesitation in condemning the agreement as against public
policy.
Id. at 636-37 & n.19. This language has been interpreted to suggest that in arbitration of mandatory law
claims such as antitrust claims, U.S. courts will take a second look to ensure that U.S. mandatory law has
been honored.
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doctrine suggests that arbitration of mandatory law claims are more palatable
to the U.S. Supreme Court if there is heightened review by national courts
beyond the minimal review permitted by the New York Convention. Under the
proposed regime, national courts would be invited to undertake heightened
review of sanction awards, facilitated by the requirement that arbitrators
articulate the bases for their decisions.2 89 As courts protect the system against
underenforcement by reviewing substantive arbitral awards, 290 so will they
protect individual attorneys against overenforcement or procedurally improper
enforcement of arbitral ethical rules by reviewing sanction awards.
3. Symbolic Categories
Symbolic concerns about contracting out the government's role in
performing public functions must be weighed against practical needs and
evaluated in light of existing powers. Any discussion about an arbitrator
sanction power must begin with the acknowledgement that arbitrators do and
will confront misconduct in proceedings before them. Misconduct by counsel
can affect the balance between the parties and, ultimately, the fairness of the
proceedings. Ignoring misconduct or failing to rectify the advantage gained by
an advocate through improper conduct taints the proceedings before the
tribunal. Over time, incidents of unfairness and an absence of even the
possibility of institutional response will damage the integrity of the larger
international arbitration system.
With misconduct comes the reality that arbitrators inevitably employ a host
of clandestine techniques to respond to misconduct or perceived misconduct,
which amount to de facto sanction powers. For example, an arbitrator who
believes that an attorney is making arguments that are not adequately rooted in
established and applicable legal doctrine may conclude that the attorney is
inherently untrustworthy and discount or disregard arguments made by that
attorney.291 It is also possible that if an arbitrator detects what she perceives to
be inappropriate pretestimonial communication with a witness, she may
discount or discredit the witness's testimony.2 92 Finally, under virtually all
international arbitral rules, arbitrators can award costs and fees using a "loser
pays" theory or a more equitable analysis that includes an assessment of
whether a party inappropriately increased the cost of arbitration. 293 Not
289 The fact that arbitration "may occur in complete secrecy" has also been cited as one of the
reasons that matters of public policy, such as mandatory statutory claims, should not be subject to
arbitration. McConnaughay, supra note 2, at 453; see also William W. Park, PrivateAdjudicatorsand the
PublicInterest:The ExpandingScope of InternationalArbitration,12 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 629, 630 (1986)
(calling for greater transparency in the arbitral process, more uniform rules of procedure, and publication

of awards as a means of increasing the legitimacy and lawfulness of international commercial
arbitration).
290 See supra Part III.B. 1.
291 For a description of the different standards regarding creative argumentation and their effect in
international arbitration, see Rogers, supra note 4, at 361-62, 376.
292 National differences among ethical standards can enhance this problem. See, e.g., Benjamin
Kaplan, Arthur T. von Mehren & Rudolph Schaefer, Phases of German Civil Procedure1,71 HARV. L.
REv. 1193, 1201 (1958) ("[G]erman judges are given to marked and explicit doubts about the reliability
of the testimony of witnesses who previously have discussed the case with counsel ....).
293 E.g., International Arbitration Rules of the Zurich Chamber of Commerce, reprinted in 5 J.
INT'L ARB. 215, 225 (1989) (providing in Article 56 that, "costs of the proceedings are, as a rule, borne
by the losing party" but allowing the tribunal "for special reasons" to "depart from this rule, especially if
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coincidentally, U.S. judges regulate misconduct primarily by awarding costs
294
and fees, thereby punishing transgressors and compensating victims.
The problem with the current exercise of these de facto sanction powers is
that they violate the most fundamental notions of due process and fundamental
fairness. These informal techniques amount to the imposition of sanctions for
unarticulated violations of unknown rules and without any opportunity to be
heard. 295 In addition, these clandestine techniques for responding to perceived
attorney misconduct may sanction an innocent party. 296 Clients may be made
to pay substantive awards and costs and fees even when the misconduct
belongs wholly to the attorney. 297
With this understanding of the current state of affairs, it becomes clear that
the debate over an arbitrator sanction power is not so much about whether to
endow arbitrators with a new power; it is about whether to acknowledge,
validate, and provide formal protections against arbitrators' use of existing
powers. For international arbitration to become a fully operational and
enduring transnational adjudicatory process,

298

arbitrators must be empowered

to guide and regulate the conduct of attorneys who participate in the process.
C. Defining the RelationshipBetween InternationalandNational Ethical
Rules

One final area of consideration raised by my proposed regime is how to
define the perimeters of arbitration ethics and arbitrators' sanction power in
relation to national ethical rules. The lifespan of an individual case can involve
pre-dispute representation and appearances in national courts, 299

participation in arbitral proceedings.

as

well as

The difficulty lies in determining

the proceeding became without object or if a party caused unnecessary costs"); GENERAL ARBITRATION
LAW art. 52 (Peru), reprinted in 3 INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Peru:
Annex 1-10 (Pieter Sanders & Albert Jan van den Berg eds., 2002) (providing that, unless otherwise
provided in the agreement, arbitrators may determine costs and fees in accordance with the terms of their
award); see also John Yukio Gotanda, Awarding Costs and Attorneys'Fees in InternationalCommercial
Arbitrations, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1, 3-4 (1999) (noting that an overwhelming number of countries
permit arbitrators to award costs and fees). As several scholars have explained, fee-shifting operates as a
means of regulating attorneys. WOLFRAM, supra note 220, at 929-930; Schneyer, supra note 121, at 35.
294 Compensation is the most frequent judicial response under Rule 11 to attorney misconduct,
even though Rule 11 does not require compensation and in fact authorizes court discretion in awarding a
wide variety of sanctions, including reprimands and fines payable to the court. Robert S. Gerber,
Bringing and Resisting Rule 11 Sanctions, 47 AM. JUR. TRIALS 521, § 15 (1993). This empirical reality
exists notwithstanding the general acknowledgement that the purpose of Rule 11 is to deter groundless
proceedings and not necessarily to compensate victims of misconduct. See Elliot v. The MV Lois B, 980
F.2d 1001, 1007 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Thomas v. Capital Sec. Servs., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 873-74 (5th
Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
295 The fact that these rules are unarticulated and unknown is exacerbated by different perceptions
of what is appropriate attorney conduct in different legal cultures. Rogers, supra note 4, at 357-59.
296 See id. at 377.
297 Indeed, clandestine sanctions may conceal from clients the existence and extent of misconduct
that victimizes them. This misconduct would, however, be brought to clients' attention if attorney
conduct was dealt with explicitly.
298 Carbonneau, supra note 186, at 580-81.
299 Even before the enforcement stage, parties to an arbitration often end up in court for a number
of reasons, including challenges to the validity of an arbitration clause, challenges to the arbitrability of a
dispute, requests for interim relief, requests for assistance in procuring discovery, and appeals of interim
awards. Henry P. DeVries, InternationalCommercialArbitration:A ContractualSubstitute for National
Courts, 57 TUL. L. REv. 42,47 n.21 (1982).
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precisely when the proposed arbitral ethics will apply and how conflicts with

national ethical regimes will be resolved. 300 Contributing to this problem is the
likelihood that misconduct in a case could be discovered after the close of
arbitral proceedings. Is it better to reconvene the arbitral tribunal or leave
national courts (or bar associations) with the task of investigating party
conduct during past arbitral proceedings? Although these may be difficult
questions to resolve, they are not unlike the problems present in any crossjurisdictional practice.
Whenever attorneys appear in a jurisdiction in which they are not licensed,
they are obligated to investigate and abide by the ethical regulations of the new
jurisdiction. At a more general level, professionals are often required to adopt
different standards of behavior in different contexts or when performing
different functions. 30 1 Attorneys may be initially reluctant to act in ways that
are permissible in international arbitration but are prohibited in their home
jurisdictions. For example, it has been observed that arbitrators who hail from
jurisdictions in which they cannot administer an oath are reluctant to put
witnesses under oath, even if the arbitration is being conducted in a place
where local law authorizes arbitrators to administer oaths.302 Similarly,
attorneys hailing from civil law jurisdictions may be reluctant to talk to
witnesses before they take the stand, even if they know that opposing counsel
is doing so. The difficulty in shifting roles is understandable, particularly for
those lawyers who only occasionally dabble in international matters. However,
for those whose role as international advocate or arbitrator is a primary
occupation, an understanding of role-shifting in different contexts and an
ability to comply with international ethical norms must be part of what defines

303
professional competence.

IV.

CONCLUSION

Arbitration has proven to be the normal way in which international

business disputes are resolved, and virtually every international contract

300 National ethical rules will necessarily apply during court proceedings to compel or stay
arbitration or to enforce an arbitral award. See, e.g., Robinson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 129 F.R.D.
15, 21 (D. Mass. 1989) (imposing sanctions for frivolous opposition to motion to compel arbitration).
This problem is complicated by the possibility that parties can modify the ethical rules at some point after
they become binding on the attorneys. See supra Part II.B.
301 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics in ADR Representation:A Road Map of CriticalIssues,
DIsP. RESOL. MAG, Winter 1997, at 3, 3 (discussing whether a different set of ethical rules for lawyers in
the alternative dispute resolution context is necessary and desirable).
302 See CRAIG ETAL., supra note 62, § 25.01, at 398-99.
303 "The lawyer in international transactions is ... an interpreter of systems and habits of thought
with a responsibility for bridging the gulf of disparate national experiences, traditions, institutions and
customs." George W. Ball, The Lawyer s Role in InternationalTransactions, 11 REC. ASS'N B. OF CITY
OF N.Y. 61 (1956), quoted in Roger J. Goebel, ProfessionalQualificationand EducationalRequirements
for Law Practicein a Foreign Country: Bridging the Culture Gap, 63 TUL. L. REV. 443, 448 (1989). See
generally Michael J. Malony & Allison Taylor Blizzard, Ethical Issues in the Context of International
Litigation: "Where Angels Fear to Tread," 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 933 (1995) (describing how in
international litigation a lawyer's duties to the client are more demanding due to added complexities of
accepting referrals, setting fees, understanding foreign laws, communicating with foreign clients, and
coordinating consent and payment logistics for a settlement).
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contains an arbitration agreement. 304 Arbitration is a highly effective and
popular form of international dispute resolution, but it is also a rather fragile
one. The functioning of the entire system depends on party confidence to
select arbitration and on simultaneous deference and support from national
legal systems to enforce arbitration agreements and awards. Historically, the
legitimacy of the system was premised on the personal integrity of its founders
and participants. Since those early days, international arbitration has grown in
popularity as its importance to international trade has been fully realized and
has expanded both in terms of the nature of claims brought and the identity of
the claimants. The days are gone when the international arbitration system
could rely on informal and largely clandestine mechanisms to control and
regulate attorney conduct.
Instead, international arbitration must develop its own set of ethical rules
that are binding and enforceable on the attorneys who practice in that arena.
The most efficient way to effectuate this goal is to relegate primary
responsibility for rulemaking and rule enforcement to those entities that have
the greatest institutional competences-arbitral institutions and arbitrators.
Permitting parties and their counsel to modify the basic rules will ensure that
the ethical rules chosen fit with the roles assigned by the arbitral procedures.
National court review of sanction awards and substantive awards will provide
the necessary constraints and controls. This proposed regime represents a
balance between the flexibility and insulation from national courts that is
necessary to keep international arbitration functioning, and the protections for
national interests that are implicated by the regulation of attorney conduct.

304 Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public Policy and International
Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293

(Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (noting that "[i]nternational arbitration is now known to be 'the' ordinary and

normal method of settling disputes of international trade"); KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993) (citing ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG ET AL., ARITRAGERECHT
134 (1988)) (estimating that ninety percent of all international commercial agreements contain arbitration

clauses).

